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THE ACTIVIST LEGACY OF THE NEW DEAL
COURT
Raoul Berger*
However the Court may interpret the provisions of
the Constitution, it is still the Constitution which is
the law, not the decisions of the Court.
Charles Warren**

The activist legacy of the New Deal Court was free-wheeling adjudication. It sprang from the Four Horsemen's obdurate identification of their
economic and social predilections with constitutional mandates, halting
the Rooseveltian reform measures in their tracks, and bringing on the
Court-Packing Plan.' Although the Plan failed, it was followed by a
shake-out resulting in the "reconstructed Court,''2 a Court that had
learned from its predecessors how to manipulate the Constitution, albeit
for a new set of goals. The transition was aptly described by Stanley Kutler, an ardent admirer of judicial activism:
From the early twentieth century through the late 1930s, academic and liberal commentators ... criticized vigorously the abusive powers of the federal judiciary . . . consistently frustrating desirable social policies ....

[T]he judges had arrogated a policymaking function not conferred upon
them by the Constitution ...negat[ing] the basic principles of representa-

tive government.., in favor of the interests of a privileged few.
...

After 1937, most of the judiciary's longtime critics suddenly found a

new faith ....The judges themselves pointed the way of the true faith as
* A.B., University of Cinncinnati 1932; J.D., Northwestern University 1935; L.L.M., Harvard
University 1938; L.L.D., University of Michigan 1978.
** 3 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT INUNITED STATES HISTORY 470 (1922). Chief Justice
Burger rejected the "thesis that what the Court said lately controls over the Constitution." L. LEVY.
AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29 (1974). Like Burger, Justices Douglas and Frankfurter claimed the right to look at the Constitution rather than what the Court had said
about it. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have
said about it"); Douglas, StareDecisis 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735,736 (1949).
1. "The actions of the [pre-New Deal] Court were attacked as being those of men consciously or
unconsciously biased in favour of capital against labour, and giving a blind allegiance to the economic doctrine of laisser-faire." M. BELOFF. THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 56, 57 (1959).
The Court "sent the whole edifice of government intervention toppling." Id. at 58.
2. So described by Justice Frankfurter in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,
487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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they rationalized a minimal judicial role for superintending economic legis3
lation while championing civil rights and civil liberties to the maximum.

Tactics that were anathema to the True Believers when employed by
the earlier Court now gained an odor of sanctity because the Warren
Court satisfied their aspirations, 4 never mind that it "arrogated a policy
making function not conferred upon it by the Constitution." "[W]hoever
places emphasis upon the product rather than the process," wrote Sidney
Hook, "upon an all-sanctifying end rather than upon the means of achieving it, is opening the doors of anarchy." 5 The Court itself has repudiated
its "use of the 'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws
which a majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise. "6 But
it continues to frustrate the will of the people when it considers their so7
cial choices unwise.
What warrant does it have for reading "liberty" to serve its social predilections? Neither the fifth nor the fourteenth amendments draws a distinction between "liberty" and "property"; the Framers, Learned Hand
remarked, would have regarded the current reading of the fifth amendment as "constitut[ing] severer restrictions as to Liberty than Property"
as a "strange anomaly." "[T]here is no constitutional basis," he
3. Kutler. Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History or Ahistorical? (Book Review). 6
HASTINGS CONST L.Q. 511. 512-13 (1979). "Only a third of a century ago. most liberal Americans
were much more concerned with cutting down the Supreme Court's power than with preserving it."
Sutherland, All Sides of the Question-Felix Frankfurter and Personal Freedom,. in FELIX FRANKFURTER-THE JUDGE 109, 152 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964).
4. Thus, Fred Rodell exulted that Chief Justice Warren "brushledl off pedantic impediments to
the results he felt were right," and that he was "almost unique" in his "'dependence on the present
day results of separate schools." Rodell, It Is the Earl Warren Court, N.Y. Times Magazine. Mar.
13, 1966, at 30. For similar activist remarks, see R. BERGER. GOVERNtENT BY JUDICIARY THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 286 n. 13 (1977).
5. S. HOOK,PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 36 (1980).
6. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726. 731 (1963).
7. Judge Learned Hand wrote that judges "wrap up their veto [of legislation] in a protective veil
of adjectives such as 'arbitrary.'.... 'inherent,' 'fundamental,' or 'essential,: whose office usually..
. is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it a derivation far more impressive than their
personal preferences, which are all that in fact lie behind thelirl decisionisl.'" L. HAND. TttE BILLOF
RIGHTS 70 (1958). We need to remember that "there still remains a distinction between a constitution
which ... provides that the law shall be whatever the supreme court thinks fit. and the actual constitution of the United States." H. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (1961).
Lest the reader consider that in focusing on due process I am beating a dead horse when presentday emphasis is on the equal protection clause. I would call attention to Herbert Packer's statement
that "the new 'substantive equal protection' has under a different label permitted today's justices to
impose their prejudices in much the same manner as the Four Horsemen once did." Packer, The Ain
of the Criminal Law Revisisted: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due Process." 44 S. CAtL L.
REV 490, 491-92 (1971). Philip Kurland likewise concluded that "The new equal protection ... is
the old substantive due process." Forun: Equal Protection and the Burger Court. 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 645, 661 (1975) (remarks of Philip Kurland). For the narrow scope of equal protection
as conceived by the framers, see infra text accompanying notes 178-82.
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averred, "for asserting a larger measure of judicial supervision over [liberty than property]." In fact, civil liberties did not loom large in the
thinking of the Founders; they were more concerned with the interests of
the collective society. 9 It was property rather than civil liberties which
they regarded as sacred. But the "reconstructed" Court, as will appear,
was little impeded by the presuppositions and intentions of the Framers.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren, this judicial revolution' o
resulted in "usurpation of general governmental powers on the pretext
that its authority derives from the Fourteenth Amendment." I
As the Court progressively realized the social aspirations of sundry
academicians (which I share), they rose to new heights in its defense. So,
Paul Brest challenged the assumption that judges are bound by the Constitution. 12 Another activist knight-errant, Robert Cover, thrust aside "the
8. L. HAND. supranote 7, at 50-51. "The great and chief end... of men," John Locke wrote,
-[in] putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property .... " Quoted in J.
RANDALL, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND 342 (1940) (quoting J. LOCKE. II TREATISE ON CIVIL
GOVERNMENT. ch. 2). For the Founders, property "was the basic liberty, because until a man was
secure in his property... life and liberty could mean little." I P. SMITH. JOHN ADAMS 272 (1962).
Hence they "warmly endorsed John Adams' deep-seated conviction that 'property is as sacred as the
laws of God.' " Mason, The Burger Court in Historical Perspective, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 87, 91
(1975). In the convention Governor Morris said, "Life and liberty were generally said to be of more
value, than property. An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless prove that property was the
main object of Society." I M. FARRAND. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 533
(1911). Madison also considered that "[t]he primary objects of civil society are the security of property and public safety." I M. FARRAND. supra, at 147. For similar sentiments of John Rutledge,
Rufus King, and Pierce Butler, see 1 M. FARRAND. supra, at 534, 541, 542. "[T]he dichotomy
between personal liberties and property rights is a false one ....
In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could
have meaning without the other." Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). John
Hart Ely also rejects the differentiation of "economic rights" from "human rights." Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wof.A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 938 (1973). They have been "essentially read as a unit." Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism:ItsAllure and hnpossibilitv, 53 IND. L.J.
399,421 (1978).
9. For the Founders, "individual rights, even the basic civil liberties that we consider so crucial,
possessed little of their modem theoretical relevance when set against the will of the peoples." G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OFTHE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. 1776-1787, at 63 (1969). "In the Convention and
later, states rights and not individual rights were the real worry." A. MASON. THE STATES RIGHTS
DEBATE: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 75 (1964). Those who insisted on a Bill of Rights,
as Cecelia Kenyon noted, "were primarily preoccupied with the failure of the Constitution to lay
down the precious and venerable common-law rules of criminal procedure." Kenyon, Men of Little
Faith:The Anti-Federalistson the Nature of Representative Government, XII WM. & MARY Q., 3d
series, 3, 19 (1955). Even today, "Iflor most men, to be deprived... of private property would be a
far greater and more deeply felt loss . . . than to be deprived of the right to speak freely." M.
OAKESHOTr, RATIONALISM INPOLITICS 44 (1962).
10. Alfred Kelly stated that the Warren Court was determined "to carry through a constitutional
equalitarian revolution." Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 119,
159.
I1. Letter from Philip Kurland to Harvard University Press (Aug. 15, 1977).
12. Brest, Tihe Misconceived Questfor the OriginalUnderstanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 224
(1980).
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Constitution's self-evident meaning" in favor of an "ideology" framed
by a non-elected, life-tenured, virtually unaccountable bench. The Constitution, he asserted, is of no moment because "we" have decided to
"entrust" judges with forming an "ideology" by which legislative action
can be measured 13 and, it may be added, the Framers' choices supplanted. Cover, of course, did not explain where "we, the people" had
spoken, whether in constitutional text, conventions or referenda. A few
drastically summarized case studies will enable us to measure the effects
of this revolution, described by an activist admirer, Louis Lusky, as an
"assertion of the power to revise the Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by article V," and as a "repudiation of the limits on judicial review that are implicit in the orthodox doctrine of Marbun, v. Madison," 14 and in fact are explicit in the
constitutional history.
Preliminarily, it needs to be recalled that application of the Bill of
Rights to the states is without constitutional foundation. Chief Justice
Marshall pointed out in Barron v. Baltimore that the Bill applied only to
6
the federal government, 15 as the legislative history plainly confirms.'
Justice Black's theory that the Bill of Rights was "incorporated" in the
fourteenth amendment' 7 was vigorously rejected by the Court. 18 But it
accomplished piecemeal incorporation under what has come to be known
as "selective incorporation." In what remains the most searching study,
Louis Henkin wrote: "Selective incorporation finds no support in the language of the [fourteenth] amendment, or in the history of its adoption,"
and it is truly "more difficult to justify than Justice Black's position that

13.

Cover. Book Review. NEw REPUtBLIC, Jan. 14. 1978. at 26. 27.

14.

Lusky. "'Governmentby JudiciatY": What Price Legithnacy? (Book Review). 6 HASTINGS

CONST L.Q. 403, 406 (1979). The Court itself rejected the notion that the Constitution may be
"'amended by judicial decision without action by the designated organs in the mode by which alone
amendments can be made." McPherson v. Blacker. 146 U.S. I. 36 (1892): see also Hawke v. Smith,
253 U.S. 221. 227 (1920).
15. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
16. For citations see R. BERGER. DEATH PENALTIES TIlE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE Cot RSE
13-14 (1982).

17. Adamson v. California. 332 U.S. 46.68 (1947) (Black. J.. dissenting).
18. Speaking for the Court in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121. 124 (1959). Justice Frankfurter
stated:
We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to the States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as
such. The relevant historical materials have been canvassed by this Court and by legal scholars.
These materials demonstrate conclusively that Congress and the members of the legislatures of
the ratifying States did not contemplate that the Fourteenth Amendment was a short-hand incorporation of the first eight amendments making them applicable as explicit restrictions upon the
States.
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the Bill of Rights was wholly incorporated."1 9 Judge Henry Friendly,
one of our ablest jurists, wrote, "it appears undisputed that the selective
incorporation theory has [no historical support]." 20 Thus, the Court's invocation of this or the other provision of the Bill of Rights constitutes the
threshold usurpation. Activists shrug this off under what appears to be a
doctrine of judicial squatter sovereignty-usurpation is legitimated by
long-continued repetition.
I.

CASE STUDIES: JUDICIAL REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION

A.

Bridges v. California

The watershed case was Bridges v. California,2 1 a five-to-four decision, in which Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined by Chief Justice
Stone and Justices Roberts and Byrnes. Bridges, a labor leader, had virtually threatened to call a strike if a then-pending decision was enforced. In
a companion case, the Los Angeles Times editorially advised the judge
that he would "make a serious mistake" to grant probation rather than a
severe sentence to certain labor "gorillas." Both were summarily held in
contempt of court for these out-of-court utterances. Reversing, 150 years
after adoption of the Bill of Rights, Justice Black discovered that the
long-recognized summary power of courts over contemptuous publications was curtailed by the first amendment and then by the fourteenth.
Liberals, myself included, heartily detested the strike-breaking use of the
contempt power. But the fact remains that this power was deeply rooted
in the common law and our own practice for 150 years. My study of the
history of the first amendment convinced me that it was not designed to
22
cut down summary contempts.
In barest outline, the first amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law." 23 Neither the amendment nor its history refers to a ban on
19. Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the FourteenthAmendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74. 77
(1963).
20. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 934,
935 (1965). To my mind, rejection of incorporation en masse entails rejection of piecemeal incorporation. The whole includes the part. The verbal justifications are most unsatisfying. See R. BERGER.
supra note 16, at 16-18. Paul Bator observed, "the way we arrived at incorporation was intellectually shoddy. It was just announced, as though it were a coup d'etat;suddenly we had incorporation."
Bator, Some Thoughts on Applied Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 58 (Special Issue,
1982).
21. 314U.S.252(1941).
22. Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1942).
23. "Insofar as the semantics of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are concerned, the
word 'laws' did not include decisions but was limited to legislative enactments." Teton, The Story of
Swift v. Tyson, 35 ILL. L. REv. 519, 537 (1941).
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the courts. By the Judiciary Act of 1789 the First Congress, an authoritative interpreter of the Constitution,24 conferred upon the courts power to
punish "contempts, '"25 a technical term, the meaning of which courts
sought in English law and practice. Blackstone, regarded by the colonists
as the oracle of the common law, stated that "liberty of the press .. .
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.''26 In the
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention James Wilson, a leading member
of the Philadelphia Convention, said, "what is meant by the liberty of the
press is, that there should be no antecedent restraint upon it."2 7 Thomas
McKean, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, who vigorously advocated adoption of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, declared in Respublica v. Oswald, an attachment for
contemptuous publication: "Could not this be done in England? Certainly
it could .... [T]here is nothing in the constitution of this state, respecting
the liberty of the press, that has not been authorized by the constitution of
that kingdom for near a century past." ' 28 Shortly thereafter Chancellor
Kent employed the summary power in People v. Freer.29 Chief Justice
Hughes referred in Near v. Minnesota to the "conceded authority of
courts to punish for contempt when publications directly tend to prevent
the proper discharge of judicial functions," 30 as Justice Holmes earlier
stated in Patterson v. Colorado.3 1 The cases upholding the summary
power are legion. 32 The fourteenth amendment, as Justice Black observed, did not go beyond the first. 33 But in Bridges, Justice Black, in my
judgment, simply molded history to rationalize a result with which I sympathize but nonetheless is extra-constitutional.

24. In this first Congress sat many members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. This
Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the
Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs long acquiesced in lixes the construction to be given its

provisions.
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928) (quoting Myers v. United States. 272
U.S. 52 (1926)).
25. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17. 1 Stat. 83 (1789).
26. 4W. BLACKSTONE. COtNIENTARIESONTHE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151 (1765-1769).
27. J. MCMASTER & F. STONE. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 308 (1888). All
"that the earlier sages of the Revolution had in view" was to erect -barriers against any previous
restraints upon publication." IJ.KENT. CONIMENTARIES ON AMFRICAN LAN' 627 (7th ed. 1851).
28.
1 DalI. 319, 322 (Pa. 1788).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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1Cai. R. 518 (N.Y.1804).
283 U.S. 697,715 (1931).
205 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1907) (citing Respublica v.Oswald, IDal. 319 (Pa. 1788)).
For citations,
see Berger. supra note 22. at620 n.129.
Bridges v.California. 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941): see Berger. supra note 22. at625 n.165.
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B.

The ReapportionmentCases

What Warren regarded as the jewel in his crown, 34 the reapportionment
decision, proceeded in the teeth of what Justice Harlan justly described as
the framers' "irrefutable and unrefuted" exclusion of suffrage from the
fourteenth amendment. 35 In a nutshell, Justice Brennan observed that
seventeen of nineteen Northern States had rejected black suffrage between 1865 and 1868.36 Consequently, Roscoe Conkling, a member of
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of both Houses, stated it would be
"futile to ask three quarters of the States to do ... the very thing which
most of them have already refused to do.' 37 Another member of that
Committee, Senator Jacob Howard, said "three fourths of the States of
38
this Union could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage."
The chairman of the Committee, Senator William Fessenden, said of a
suffrage proposal that "there [is not] the slightest probability that it will
be adopted by the States." ' 39 The unanimous report of the Committee
doubted that "the States would consent to surrender a power they had
always exercised, and to which they were attached," and therefore
thought it best to "leave the whole question with the people of each
State." 40 That such was the vastly preponderant opinion is confirmed by
a remarkable fact. During the pendency of ratification, radical opposition
to the readmission of Tennessee because its constitution excluded Negro
suffrage was voted down in the House 125-to-12. Senator Charles Sumner's parallel proposal was rejected 34-to-4. 4 1 The fifteenth amendment
was later adopted, its framers stated, to fill the gap left by the failure of
the fourteenth to ban discriminatory exclusion from suffrage. 42 His own
34. G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 238 (1982). Paul Bator stressed the need for "rooting the language of the Fourteenth Amendment within some limits of historical purpose-that is, of
trying to understand the language in the context of the legal culture of its framers and the purposes
they were trying to achieve." Bator, Some Thoughts on Applied Federalism, 6 HARV. J. PUB. POL.
53,54 (1982).
35. See infra text accompanying note 43.
36. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 256 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
37. CONo. GLOBE 358, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
38. Id. at 2766.
39. Id. at 704.
40. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, S. REP. No. 112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1866), reprintedin THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 94 (A. Avins ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as RECONSTRUCTION AMENDS.].
41. For details, see Berger, supranote 4, at 56, 59-60, 79.
42. For citations, see Berger, The FourteenthAmendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 Nw.
U.L. REv. 311, 321-23 (1979). A Court contemporary with the fifteenth amendment declared that
before adoption of that amendment a state could "exclude citizens of the United States from voting
on account of race . . . . [Tihe Amendment has invested citizens of the United States with a new
constitutional right." United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1876).
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masterly collection of the historical facts led Justice Harlan to conclude
that the argument for reapportionment flew "in the face of irrefutable and
still unanswered history to the contrary." 43 My independent study of the
history richly confirmed Harlan. 44 Gerald Gunther wrote that "most constitutional lawyers agree" that "the 'one person-one vote' ruling.
lacks all historical justification. ' 45 Summing up, Robert Bork stated:
"The principle of one man, one vote . . . runs counter to the text of the
fourteenth amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and ratification and the political practice of Americans from colonial times up to the
day the Court invented the new formula." 46 Warren's worshipful biographer and former law clerk commented:
Warren had based his purported usurpation of legislative prerogatives on
an interpretation of the Constitution that was neither faithful to its literal text
nor consistent with the context in which it had been framed. He had substituted homilies such as "[c]itizens. not history or economic interests, cast
47
votes" for doctrinal analysis.
The history Warren dismissed was the framers' determination to exclude suffrage from the fourteenth amendment, thereby reversing the
choice they made. As G. Edward White further stated, "Baker v.Carr
found a judicial power to review the political judgments of legislators
where none had previously existed." 4 8
C.

The DesegregationDecision: Brown v. Board of Education

Little less convincing is the case for exclusion of segregation from the
fourteenth amendment. Richard Kluger, author of a laudatory history of
Brown v. Board of Education, asked: "Could it be reasonably claimed
that segregation had been outlawed by the Fourteenth when the yet more
basic emblem of citizenship--the ballot-had been withheld from the
Negro under that amendment?"49 The temper of the times is disclosed by
Senator James Harlan's remarks when desegregation of the District of
Columbia schools was under discussion in April, 1860:
I know there is an objection to the association of colored children with white
children in the same schools. This prejudice exists in my own State [Iowa].
43. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.. concurring). Louis Lusky
considers that Harlan's demonstration is "'irrefutable and unrefuted." Lusky. supro note 14. at 406.
44. Berger, supra note 4,at 52-68; Nathanson, Book Review. 56 TEx L. REv 579. 581 (1978).
45. Gunther, Book Review, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 25, 1977. at 4,col. 5.
46. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendnent Problems, 47 IND L.J. I. 18 (1971).
47. G. WHITE. supra note 34, at 239.
48. Id. at 357.
49.

R. KLUGER. SIMPLE JUSTICE 635 (1976).
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It would be impossible to carry a proposition in Iowa to educate the few
colored children that now live in that State in the same schoolhouses with
50
the white children.

To have upended segregated schools, Charles Fairman considers,
"would have exposed the [Civil Rights] bill to active opposition in the
North." 5 1 Cognizant of such sentiments, James Wilson, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, assured the House that the terms of the Civil
Rights Bill, which it was the purpose of the fourteenth amendment to
incorporate, did not mean that the children of "all citizens" shall attend
the same schools. 52 The framers' pervasive assumption, recorded in the
debates, was that black children would attend separate schools, 53 if only,
as Alexander Bickel explained, because "It was preposterous to worry
about unsegregated schools, for example, when hardly a beginning had
been made at educating Negroes at all and when obviously special efforts,
suitable only for Negroes, would have to be made.' '54 As late as 1875,
Senator Sumner, who had pressed increasingly for mixed schools, could
not persuade the Senate, prepared to accept equal accommodations in
inns and transportation, to include schools. Senator Sargent of California
urged that the common school proposal would reinforce "a prejudice
powerful, permeating every part of the country, and existing more or less
in every man's mind. ' 55 A similar statement was made in the House by
Barbour Lewis of Tennessee. 56 More and more activist commentators
agree that the framers of the fourteenth amendment excluded segregation. 57 Consequently the desegregation decision represents a square
50. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1680 (1860).
51. C. FAIRMAN, HIsTORYOFTHE SUPREME COURTOFTHE UNITED STATES 1179 (1971). An Indian
Radical, George Julian, told the House, "the real trouble is that we hate the negro," CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., IstSess. 257 (1866), a remark echoed by Senator Lane, id. at 739, Representative
Cullom, id. at 911, and Senator Stewart, id. at 2799. Senator John Sherman of Ohio said, "we do not
like negroes. We do not disguise our dislike." Woodward, Seeds of Failurein Radical Race Policy.
in NEw FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 128 (H. Hyman ed. 1966). William Gillette
wrote, "public opinion strongly opposed Negro rights, and the state legislators who outraged this
consensus would commit political suicide." W. GiLLETTE. THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE
PASSAGE OFTHE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 80 (1965).
52. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). A number of contemporaneous constructions of the fourteenth amendment by northern courts are to the same effect. See infra Appendix.
53. Berger, supranote 4, at 125-27.
54. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 654(1976).
55. See RECONSTRUCTION AMENDS., supra note 40, at 705. In 1883 the New York court, passing
on an 1864 statute providing for separate schools for blacks, stated, "The attempt to enforce social
intimacy and intercourse between the races, by legal enactments, would probably tend only to embitter the prejudices.., which exist between them." People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438,
448 (1883).
56. RECONSTRUCTION AMENDS., supranote 40, at 726.
57. Nathaniel Nathanson wrote about my demonstration that the fourteenth amendment "would
not require school desegration or negro suffrage. These are not surprising historical conclusions. The

Washington Law Review

Vol. 59:751, 1984

reversal of the will of the framers. Warren's biographer concludes that
"when one divorces Warren's opinions from their ethical premises, they
evaporate.... [T]hey are individual examples of [Warren's own] beliefs
leading to judgments. "58
Let it be assumed that segregation necessitated a breakout from constitutional limits; the trouble is, as Hamilton presciently noted in The Federalist, that "every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by
necessity ... f irms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of
necessity does not exist at all."

59

What "necessity,"

what evil con-

demned by many, required the Court to cut down the hallowed twelveman jury, to saddle the States with the duty immediately to support outof-state indigent migrants, to curtail death penalties? Of these in turn.
D.

Williams v. Florida: The Twelve-Man Jury

The twelve-man jury, Coke wrote, was "very ancient.' 60 Usage, Matthew Bacon's Abridgment stated, called for a "petit jury of twelve, and
can be neither more nor less," as Chief Justice Matthew Hale had earlier
declared. 6' Trial by jury, this "most transcendent privilege," Blackstone
observed, required a jury of twelve. 62 The South Carolina Constitution
provided, for example, that "trial by jury, as heretofore used... shall be
forever inviolably preserved. 63 In Holmes v. Walton, a statute providing
for a six-man jury was held contrary to the 1776 New Jersey Constitution
first was quite conclusively demonstrated by Alexander Bickel ..

.

.Berger's independent research

and analysis confirms and adds weight to those conclusions." Nathanson. supra note 44, at 581: see
also Abraham, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST L.Q. 467, 467-68 (1979): Alexander, Modern
Equal Protection Theories:A MetatheoreticalTaxononv and Critique, 42 OHIO ST L.J. 3.6 (1981 ):
Levinson, The Turn Toward Functionalism in Constitutional Theory. 8 U. DAYTON L. REV 567. 578
(1983); Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression and Equal Protection. 42 OHIO ST L.J. 261.
285-86 n. 100, 292 (1981).
58. G. WHITE, supra note 34, at 367.
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 158 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941).
60. 1 T. COKE. INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 155b (1628-1641).
61. 5 M. BACON. A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. Juries (A) at 234 (3d. ed.
1768); 2 M. HALE. HISTORY OFTHE PLEAS OFTHE CROWN 161 (1736).
62. 3 W. BLACKSTONE. supra note 26, at 379; see also id. at 358, 365.
63. Article IX, § 6; see 2 B. POORE. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS. COLONIAL CHARTERS
1633 (1877). Seven states enacted statutes providing that the petit jury must be composed of 12 men:
New Hampshire: Act of Jan. 17, 1777, Acts and Laws of New Hampshire 65 (1780): New York: Act
of April 19, 1786, Article XVI, Laws of New York 266 (Greenleaf ed. 1792): North Carolina: Act of
November 10, 1779, Chapter VI, Laws of North Carolina 388 (Iredell ed. 1791): Pennsylvania: Act
of March 19, 1785, § 9, Laws of Pennsylvania 262-265 (Dallas ed. 1793): Rhode Island: Session of
March 18, 1776, p. 316: South Carolina: Act of August 20. 1731, Public Laws of South Carolina 125
(Grimke ed. 1790); Virginia: Session of October 20, 1777. Chapter XVII, Art. XI. Collection of
Public Acts 1776-1783 (1785).
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which preserved the "inestimable right of trial by jury.' "64 In the Virginia
Ratification Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph stated: "There is
no suspicion that less than twelve jurors will be thought sufficient.''65
The Court itself held in Patton v. United States that it "is not open to
question ... that the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more nor
66
less."
All this was thrown into the discard by Williams v. Florida67 as "a
historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise to the
jury in the first place," dismissing "superstitious insights into the significance of '12.' "68 "Superstitions" cherished by the hard-headed Chief
Justice Coke and which for 600 years have been embodied in law and
practice are not so easily dismissed. As the Court held per Justice
Holmes: "If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect
it .... ",69 The idiosyncratic nature of the six-man decision is pointed up
by the subsequent Burch v. Louisiana, rejecting a five-man jury, though
ruefully admitting that "the line between six members and five was not
altogether easy to justify.' '70 The line drawn at "twelve" for 600 years
needed no justification. The governing criterion was voiced anew by
Chief Justice Burger in the recent legislative chaplain case: "Clearly the
men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clause did not view paid
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.''7 1 By that
64. The case, not officially reported, is discussed in C. HAINES. THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 92-95 (1932).
65. 3 DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OFTHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 467 (J. Elliot ed. 18jj). Julius Goebel adverted to "popular sensitivity regarding any tampering

with the 'inestimable' right of jury trial," and concluded that "[a]ny suggestion that the jury system
as then entrenched might be amended in any detail was beyond tolerance." 1 J. GOEBEL. HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURTOFTHE UNIrED STATES 141,493 (1971).
66. 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); see also Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898) ("the
words 'trial by jury' were placed in the Constitution ... with reference to the meaning affixed to
them in the law as it was in this country and in England at the time of the adoption of that instrument.").
67. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
68. Id. at 88, 89-90. On the other hand, Justice Holmes said, "A common-law judge could not
say, 'I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce it.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
69. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922); see also Hampton & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 621 (1842) (Story,
J., delivering opinion of the Court, as quoted infra text accompanying note 86); T. COOLEY. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS 67 (1883) (quoted infra note 86).
70. 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979). One is reminded of the chant in George Orwell's Animal Farm 38
(1946): "FOUR LEGS GOOD, TWO LEGS BAD."
71. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3334 (1983). In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311
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unimpeachable test the twelve-man jury, death penalties, and out-of-state
indigent decisions, cannot stand up. Rather, they illustrate that constitu72
tional decisions are a product of the Justices' "gut" reactions.
E.

Shapiro v. Thompson: MigrantIndigents' Right To Support

Resting on the "right to travel," Shapiro v. Thompson173 struck down
state requirements of one year of residence before an indigent migrant
would be eligible for "welfare" aid. An advocate of the unrestricted right
to travel, Zechariah Chafee, wrote, "[T]here is a queer uncertainty about
what clause in the Constitution establishes this right" to travel. 74 Justice
Harlan stamped it a "nebulous judicial construct";75 and the Shapiro majority noted that the "right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution,"
but found "no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision," content that it "has been
firmly established"--by the Court. 76 But such self-serving statements do
not dispense with the necessity of finding constitutional footing for curtailment of long-settled states' rights. Assuming the existence of a "right
to travel," it is a manifest non sequitur to insist that it entitles a migrant to
77
immediate support at the terminus.
For 600 years the law and practice were to the contrary, reaching back
to pre-Elizabethan custom and law, picked up by colonial enactments
and, at the time of Shapiro, expressed in the statutes of forty or more
States. 78 As Margaret Rosenheim, an admirer of Shapiro, wrote, the
" 'durational residence requirement' had 'seemed to be permanent'; derived from the Elizabethan Poor Law, it 'had been part of the states' poor
relief laws from the beginning." 79 English and colonial communities excluded pauper-strangers from support in order to reduce the burden of
relief. In providing for the "privileges and immmunities" to be extended
to residents of sister States, Article IV of the Articles of Confederation
(1963), the Court stated that the "historic conception of the writ [of habeas corpus]. anchored in the

ancient common law and in our Constitution ... has remained constant to the present day."
72. Justice Douglas disclosed that "the 'gut' reactions, of a judge at the level of constitutional
adjudications, dealing with the vagaries of due process ... was the main ingredient of his decision."

W. DOUGLAS. THE COURT YEARS. 1939-1975. at 8 (1980); see also supra note 7.
73. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Harlan dissented.
74.
75.
in part).
76.
77.

Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 188 (1956).
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 216 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,630 (1969).
See Berger, Residence Requirements for Welfare and Voting: A Post-Mortem. 42 OHtO ST
L.J. 853, 854 n.8 (1981).
78. Id. at 854-66.
79. Id. at 855.
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declared that the "people of each State shall havefree ingress and regress
'
to and from any other state . . .paupers . ..excepted. "80 Just as the
"privileges or immunities" of the fourteenth amendment were "intended
1
the
[to be] the same" as those of Article IV,8 so the latter carried all
82
"limitations" of the predecessor Articles of Confederation phrase. So
there is good reason to conclude that the exclusion of paupers has constitutional sanction.
Very early the constitutional validity of state law reflecting these prac83
tices was recognized by the Court in Mayor of New York v. Miln. Although Justice Story dissented, he "admitted" that the States "have a
right to pass poor laws, and laws to prevent the introduction of pau85
pers," 84 all being in agreement as to the right to exclude paupers. As
Justice Story remarked in a similar case, "such long acquiescence in it,
such contemporaneous expositions of it, and such extensive and uniform
recognition [and embodiment in State law of it]... would ... entitle the
question to be considered at rest.'"86 Were the issue doubtful, the welfare
of indigent migrants should be balanced against the burden upon local
taxpayers of supporting them. The recent deluge of 100,000 Cubans has
overtaxed the capacity of Miami to provide needed services and support. 87 For 600 years English, colonial, and state law protected
80. Id. at 862.
81. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1873).
-[T]he text of article 4, § 2, of the Constitution, makes manifest that it was drawn with
82.
reference to the corresponding clause of the Articles of Confederation and was intended to perpetuate
its limitations ...." United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920).
83. 36U.S. (ll Pet.) 102(1837).
84. Id. at 156 (Story, J.,dissenting).
85. See also Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470-71 (1877): The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 283,406 (1849).
86. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra note 69; for similar utterances, see Berger, supra note 77. at
859 n.48. Contemporaneously with the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Chief Justice Thomas
Cooley, with Justice Story a preeminent commentator of the Constitution. wrote:
A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent
time when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case
seem desirable. A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions would be
lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by
public opinion. . . . [A] court or legislature which should allow a change in public sentiment to
influence it in giving construction to a written constitution a construction not warrantedby the
intention of the Jounders. would be justly chargeable with reckless disregard of official oath and
public duty; and if its course could become a precedent. these instruments would be of little
avail.
T. COOLEY. supra note 69, at 67 (emphasis added). So taken for granted was the "original understanding" rule, that another contemporary court could say without troubling to cite cases that "[olne
of the cardinal rules of construction is,that courts shall give effect to the intent of the framers of the
instrument." Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 342 (1874).
87. John V. Lindsay, former Mayor of New York. wrote that the federal government must
relieve states and local governments of the fiscal burdens that are brought to their doorsteps by
the migrating poor. . . . Urban areas, which have become the repositories of the poorest of the
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ratepayers from support of indigent migrants. When the Court outlawed
such laws in 1969, it disregarded established criteria of constitutionality.
The Death Penalt, Cases

F.

A final example of unwarranted manipulation of constitutional terms is
furnished by the Court's intrusion into the field of death penalties. Hamilton had assured the Ratifiers in FederalistNo. 17 that "Itihere is one
transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State governments . . .the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice." 88
Nevertheless the Court, under cover of "selective incorporation." has
held that a death penalty for rape 89 or for a murderer's accomplice violates the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the eighth amendment. 90 And under that banner it has required unprecedented "standards"
for jury sentencing that have enabled it to overturn convictions of undoubted murderers. 9' For 300 years, from 1689 when the English Bill of
Rights first employed the phrase, until 1972 when the Court belatedly
discovered that it curtailed the right to punish by death, such penalties had
been employed without let or hindrance. Before that discovery, Hugo Bedau, an impassioned opponent of death penalties, stated. "No death sentence had ever been voided as a violation of due process, equal protection" or "cruel and unusual punishment." 92 "Until fifteen years ago,"
he wrote, "save for a few mavericks, no one gave any credence to the
possibility of ending the death penalty by judicial interpretation of constitutional law. . . . Save for a few eccentrics and visionaries," he remarked, the death penalty was "taken for granted by all men . . . as a
bulwark of the social structure." 93 To borrow from the Court's 1983
"legislative chaplain" decision, a practice that "has continued without
interruption ever since [the earliest] session of Congress" 94 cannot be
nation's poor. will never be able to deliver the essential services . . .as long as they are oppressed by such Federal mandates as welfare and Medicaid.
N.Y. Times. Feb. 5, 1981, at A-23.
88. THE FEDERALIST No 17 at 103 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941). He repeated in the New York Ratification Convention. "the states have certain independent powers. in which their laws are supreme: for
example, in making and executing laws concerning the punishment of certain crimes, such as murder, theft, etc.. the states cannot be controlled." 2 ELLIOT. supra note 65, at 362.
89. Coker v. Georgia. 433 U.S. 584(1977).
90. Enmund v. Florida. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
91.

R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 128-42 119821

H. BEDAU. THE COURTS. THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAl. PUNISHMENT 81-83 11977).
93. Id.at 118, 120.
94. Marsh v. Chambers. 103 S. Ct. 3330. 3334 (1983). Commenting on a construction by the
First Congress. confirmed by a practice of 40 years. Madison stated. "No novel construction. however ingeniously devised ...can withstand the weight of such authorities, or the unbroken current of
so prolonged and universal a practice." 4 ELLIOT. supra note 65. at 602.
92.

The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court

deemed a "cruel and unusual punishment." That particular Congress had
drafted the eighth amendment, and it enacted a statute which made murder, robbery, and other offenses punishable by death; and to safeguard the
penalty it prohibited resort to "benefit of clergy" as an exemption from
capital punishment. 95 Further evidence that the Framers did not intend to
bar death penalties is furnished by the face of the Constitution, what another "opponent of death penalities," Sanford Levinson, considers a
"devastating" fact: "[B]oth the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments specifically acknowledge the possibility of a death penalty. They require
only that due process of law be followed before a person can be deprived
of life." And he reluctantly concedes that "Berger easily shows that the
various framers did not regard infliction of death as cruel or unusual.' '96
Fourteen months before the split Court in Furman v. Georgia97 demanded "standards" for the guidance of juries, it declared in McGautha
v. California: "we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in
capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. "98
That conclusion, I found, is confirmed by the historical materials; 99 to
cite only the summation by Chief Justice Thomas Cooley, who said of an
attempt
to surround the jury with arbitrary rules as to the weight they shall allow the
evidence [which is at the heart of the Court-imposed "standards"] .. .no
such arbitrary rules are admissible ... [T]he jury must be left to weigh the
evidence by their own tests. They cannot properly be furnished for this purpose with balances which leave them no discretion. too
"Cruel and unusual punishment" left this discretion untouched, for it
applied only to the nature of the punishment, not to the process whereby
it was decreed. The "untrammeled discretion" enjoyed for centuries by
the jury was an "attribute" of the "trial by jury"''
secured by the
95. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 115, 119. This exemption was first afforded to the
clergy and then to such of the laity as could read. M. RADIN. ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

230-31 (1936). See Hampton Co. v. United States, supra note 24.
96. Levinson, Wrong But Legal?, NATION. Feb. 26, 1983, at 248-49.
97. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
98. 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971).
99. R. BERGER, supra note 91, at133-39.
100. People v.Garbutt, 17 MICH. L. REV.9, 27-28 (1868). The Founders placed their
faith
in
juries, not in judges. R. BERGER, supra note 91, at133-34. As said by Herbert Storing, "the jury trial
provided the people's safeguard at the bottom, administrative level." I H. STORING. THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 19 (1981) (quoting the Federal Farmer: " 'by holding the jury's right to return a

general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to the people at large, their just and rightful control in
the judicial department' ").

101.

For assurances by John Marshall, Edmund Randolph, and Edmund Pendleton that "trial by
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Constitution and therefore protected from judicial control. 102 It follows
that the "standards" requirement-which has resulted in a wilderness of
0 4
confusion 10 3 and a death row log-jam-is "unconstitutional."
In revising the meaning that "cruel and unusual" had for the Framers,
the Court followed in the footsteps of Robespierre: "If Frenchmen would
not be free and virtuous voluntarily, then he would force them to be free
and cram virtue down their throats." 105 Be it assumed that death penalties
are a savage survival, the Court is not empowered to cram its morals
down the throats of the American people. They were not deprived by the
Constitution of the right to make their own moral choices. Jealously rationing power, circumscribing it at every step, the Framers resorted to
familiar common law terms to prick out those limits. If the Court is free to
substitute its own meaning for the established content of the constitutional
06
terms, it obliterates those limits and substitutes its own predilections. 1
In turning its back on the practice that obtained at the adoption of the
Constitution and persisted for another 181 years, the Court assumed
power to amend the Constitution, a power that was reserved to the people.
II.

ACTIVIST JUSTIFICATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVISIONISM
Activist writings, Mark Tushnet observes, are "plainly designed to

jury" embraced all its "'attributes." see 3 J. ELLIOT. DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OFTHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 463. 546, 549. 559 (2d ed. 1836).
102. Trial by jury is mentioned several times in the Constitution: judicial review not at all. In the

Convention, Elbridge Gerry -urged the necessity of Juries to guard lagainst] corrupt Judges." 2 M.
FARRAND. supra note 8. at 587. Insistence on "'standards" for jury verdicts runs counter to Wilson's
praise in the Pennsylvania Ratilication Convention of 'another advantage annexed to the trial by
jury; the jurors may indeed return a mistaken, or ill founded verdict. but their errors cannot be
systematical." J. MCMASTER & F. STONE. supra note 27. at 404. See. H. STORING, supra note 100.

The Founders had in mind jury control ofjudges. not judicial control of juries.
103.

R. BERGER, supra note 91, at 139-52.

104.

In Erie Ry. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). the Court. per Justice Brandeis. quoting

Justice Holmes, branded the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) an "'unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States which no lapse of time ... should
make us hesitate to correct."
105.

1 C. BRINTON. J. CHRISTOPHER & R. WOLFF. A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 115 (1960). From

"'their experiences under the Protectorate, Englishmen learned that ...

the claims of self-appointed

saints to know by divine inspiration what the good life should be and to have the right to impose their

notions on the ungodly could be as great a threat as the divine right of kings." Auden. Introduction to
S. SMITH. SELECTED WRITINGS at xvi (W. Auden ed. 1956).
106. See infra text accompanying note 126: and f. Hampton & Co. v. United States. 276 U.S.

394 (1928). quoted supra note 24.
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protect the legacy of the Warren Court," 107 and to that end activists are
busily spinning theories whose only merit is novelty. 108
A.

The "Original Intention"

Activist attacks on the original intention rule are a very recent phenomenon, inspired by the need to protect the desegregation and reapportionment decisions which demonstrably are contrary to the framers' intention.
Typical is Paul Brest:
[M]any scholars and judges reject Berger's major premise, that constitutional interpretation should depend chiefly on the intent of those who framed
and adopted a provision. . . . [W]hatever the framers' expectations may
have been, broad constitutional guarantees require the Court to discern, articulate and apply values that are widely and deeply held by our society ....109

"Widely and deeply held" cannot be said of the school prayer, abortion,
and death penalty decisions. And among the judges who do not share
Brest's view was his beloved mentor, 110 Justice Harlan: "When the Court
disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power was
committed ...."111 In truth, activists seek to jettison a doctrine of which
Jacobus tenBroek, a critic of the rule, said "[the Court] has insisted, with
almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object of constitutional
construction is the discovery of the intention of those persons who formulated the instrument ....

107. Tushnet, Legal Realism, StructuralReview and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809, 811
(1983).
108. Brest adjures academe "simply to acknowledge that most of our writings [about judicial
review] are not political theory but advocacy scholarship--amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good." Brest, The FundamentalRights
Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109
(1981). See also his rejection of the rationalizations of "seven representative scholars," id. at
1067-89.
109. Brest, Book Review, N.Y.Times, Dec. 11, 1977, at II col. 2. But Brest blows hot and cold
on the issue. When he attacks congressional control of federal jurisdiction, in the face of an unequivocal grant by article III, he does not scruple to call upon the "intention" of the Framers. P. BREST.
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1329 (1975).
110. So Harlan is identified in Brest's dedication of his casebook, P. BREST, supra note 109, at
1329.
111. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra note 80.
112. tenBroek, Use by the Supreme Court of Extrinsic Evidence in ConstitutionalConstruction:
The Intent Theory of ConstitutionalConstruction,27 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1939).
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1. Common Law Terms
It will be illuminating first to discuss the Framers' cognate employment
of common law terms. The Founders resorted to a written constitution the
more clearly to limit delegated power, to establish a "fixed" constitution
alterable only by amendment. 113 A key means for accomplishment of that
purpose was their use of common law terms of established and familiar
meaning. 114 Doubtless, the Framers were aware of the long-settled rule of
construction expressed in Matthew Bacon's Abridgment: "If a statute
makes use of a Word the meaning of which is well known at the Common
Law, the Word shall be understood in the same sense it was understood at
the Common Law." 115 Chief Justice Marshall applied the rule in Gibbons
v. Ogden, stating that if a word was understood in a certain sense "when
the Constitution was framed ... the convention must have used it in that
sense," and it is that sense that is to be given judicial effect.' 6 A procession of judges followed in his path. 117 And in 1925 the Court explained:
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by
reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when
the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the
Convention ...were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common
law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary.... [Wihen they came to put
their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they
expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be
shortly and easily understood. 118
Examples of such terms are bills of attainder, ex post facto, habeas
corpus, and trial by jury. To express all that was implicated in "trial by
113. P. KURLAND. WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1983). Justice William Paterson. a
leading Framer, declared. "The constitution is certain and fixed ... and can be revoked or altered
only by the authority that made it." Van Home v. Dorrance. 28 F. Cas. 1012. 1014 (1795) (No.
16.857). Chief Justice Marshall, who had been a proponent of judicial review in the Virginia Ratification Convention, declared that a written constitution was designed to define and limit power. and
asked, "To what purpose are powers limited ... if those limits may. at any time. be passed by those
intended to be restrained." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137. 176 (1803).
Justice Story emphasized that:
the government of the United States is one of limited and enumerated powers: and that a departure from the true import and sense of its powers is protanto the establishment of a new constitution. It is doing for the people, what they have not chosen to do for themselves. It is usurping the
functions of a legislator.
IJ. STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES § 426 (5th ed. 1905).

114. For a detailed discussion, see R. BERGER. supra note 91. at 59-76.
115. 4M.BACON. supra note 6
l. at(1),
(4).
116. 22U.S. (9Wheat.) 1,190(1824);seealsoThompsonv. Utah. 170U.S.343,350(1898).
117. For citations, see Berger, Bills of Attainder: A StudY of Anendinent by the Court. 64 CORNELL L. REV 355,361, 362-63 n.55 (1978).

118. Exparte Grossman. 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925).
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jury," for example, would have required prolix detail unsuited to a
"compact draft." Hence, when anxious delegates inquired whether they
would have the prized right to challenge jurors, they were assured that it
was an "attribute" of trial by jury." l 9 So rooted was the presupposition
that English law would apply that the First Congress prohibited resort to
"benefit of clergy" as an exemption from capital punishment. 120 Consequently, as Justice Story stated in 1820, the common law "definitions are
necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text of the act." 121
Activists counter that over the years words change their meaning. 122
But it does not follow that we may saddle the Framers with our meaning. 123 Even Humpty Dumpty did not carry it so far as to insist that when
Alice "used" a word he could dictate what she meant. The beau ideal of
activists, Chief Justice Warren, said, "[t]he provisions of the Constitution" are "the rules of government." 124 By changing the meaning of the
words in which they were framed the Court changes the rules, thereby
reducing written limits on power to ropes of sand. Chief Justice Taney
perceived that "[i]f in this Court we are at liberty to give old words new
meanings... there is no power which may not, by this mode of construction, be conferred on the general government and denied to the
States." 125 That constitutional terms must mean what they meant to the
119. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 467-68, 546, 556-59. Justice Bushrod Washington stated,
"The right of challenge was a privilege highly esteemed and anxiously guarded at the common law..
." United States v. Johns, 26 F. Cas. 616, 617 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 15.481).
120. See supranote 95.
121. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820) (emphasis added).
122. E.g. Wofford, The BlindingLight: The Uses of History in ConstitutionalInterpretation.31
U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 523 (1964); cf. L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 71 (1972).

123. In his casebook, Brest wrote:
Suppose that the Constitution provided that some acts were to be performed "bi-weekly." At
the time of the framing of the Constitution, this meant only "once every two weeks": but modem dictionaries, bowing to pervasive misuse, now report "twice a week" (i.e., semi-weekly) as
an acceptable definition. To construe the provision now to mean "semi-weekly" would certainly be a change of meaning (and an improper one at that).
P. BREST. supranote 109, at 146 n.38. That has been the accepted view:
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant
when adopted it means now ....
Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial
character of this court, and make it a mere reflex of the popular opinions or passion of the day."
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448, 449 (1905). Activists seek to bend the Court to
their own passions, see supranote 108, often at war with those of the people.
124. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958). Warren's comment reveals his constitutional
naivete, for in this very case he was engaged in rewriting the "rules." R. BERGER. supra note 91, at
116-22.
125. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 478 (1849) (Taney, C.J. dissenting). Madison
stated, if "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation ... be not the
guide in expounding it, there can be no security . . . for a faithful exercise of its powers." 9 J.
MADISON. WRITINGS 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910).

769

Vol. 59:751. 1984

Washington Law Review

Framers was categorically stated by the Court. 126 With Willard Hurst, I
would underscore that "[i]f the idea of a document of superior legal authority"--the "fixed Constitution" dear to the Framers--"is to have
meaning, terms which have a precise, history-filled content to those who
draft and adopt the document [or to which they attach a clear meaning]
1 27
must be held to that precise meaning."
2.

The Framers'Intention

For Hurst, the terms to which the Framers attached clear meaning128
were no more alterable than common law words of established meaning.
Common sense demands no less. Why should words which are defined by
external common law practice weigh more heavily than those clearly explained by the draftsmen themselves? Respect for their intention goes
back to medieval days, as the Court noted, saying "the books are full of
authorities to the effect that the intention of the lawmaking power will
prevail, even against the letter of the statute. .

.

. 'The intention of the

lawmaker is the law.' "129 That was the established rule at the framing of
the Constitution. In a treatise known to colonists, Thomas Rutherforth
assimilated the interpretation of statutes to that of contracts and wills, and
stated that "[t]he end, which interpreters aim at, is to find out what was
the intention of the writer to clear up the meaning of his words." 130 On
the heels of the Convention, Justice James Wilson, second only to Madison as an architect of the Constitution, said, "[t]he first and governing
maxim in the interpretation of a statute is, to discover the meaning of
those, who made it." 31 The reason was made clear by Justice Story,
126. See South Carolina v. United States. supra note 116. and Marshall. C.J. supra text accompanying note 116.
127.

Hurst, The Process of Constitutional Construction, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LA%,

55. 57 (E. Cahn ed. 1954).
128. It needs emphasis that I did not treat anbiguous legislative history but confined myself to
the framers' unnistakable intention to exclude suffrage and segregation from the ambit of the fourteenth amendment.
129. Hawaiiv. Mankichi. 190U.S. 197.212(1903).
130.

T. RUTHERFORTH. INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAw 307 (1754-1756). Rutherforth's INSTITUTE.

said Justice Story, "'contain a very lucid exposition of the general rules of interpretation." I STORY.
supra note 113, § 403 n.L, at 285. Justice Robert Yates of the New York Supreme Court and a
delegate to the Convention, wrote under the pseudonym "Brutus" that the Constitution is to be explained "'according to the rules laid down for construing a law." C. KENYON. TttE ANTIFEDERALISTS
337 (1966).

Recognition of the writer's intention is the very essence of communication. As Walter Benn
Michaels observes. "no one treats sounds or marks as words unless he or she thinks of them as
speech acts expressing the intentions of some agent. No one would even try to interpret the Constitution if everyone thought it had been put together by a tribe of monkeys with quills." Michaels. Book
Review, 61 TEx L. REv 765,774 (1982) (footnote omitted).
131.
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THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 75 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). Justice Holmes observed. "Of
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asking how a federal statute is to be interpreted. "Are the rules of the
common law to furnish the proper guide, or is every court and department
to give it any interpretation it may please, according to its own arbitrary
will?"'132 The Founders preferred rules, in the words of Chancellor Kent,
to "a dangerous discretion . . . to roam at large in the trackless field of
33
[the judges'] own imagination." 1
In a "blinding" flash of insight, Judge John Gibbons of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 134 rejected the application "to constitutional history
of the inadequate tools of statutory interpretation." 135 Are judges to enjoy
greater discretion in seeking the will of the Framers than they do in the
case of mere legislators? Why indeed should we be willing to effectuate
the will of a testator and deny effect to the unmistakable intention of the
Framers? Gibbons overlooked that the common law proceeds by analogy,
from wills to staiutes, from statutes to constitutions. Since the common
law knew no written constitutions, judges had to turn, as did Marshall, to
rules pertaining to "other legal documents." 136 Edward Corwin observed
that our early judges adapted "the numerous [common law] rules for construction of written instruments ... to the business of constitutional construction." 137 Julius Goebel likewise noted that the Founders were accustomed to "resort to the accepted rules of statutory interpretation to settle

course, the purpose of written instruments is to express some intention or state of mind of those who
write them, and it is desirable to make that purpose effectual .
0. HOLMES. COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 206 (1920).
132. 1 J. STORY, supranote 113, § 158 n.2, at 112.
133.

1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (9th ed. 1858).

134. Gibbons charged me with discerning the original intention "with blinding clarity in the
stygian darkness of the records of the 39th Congress." Gibbons, Book Review, 31 RUTGERS L. REV.
839, 840 (1978). This about the "irrefutable" exclusion of suffrage from the fourteenth amendment!
135. Id. at 847. President Washington, however, appealed to the original understanding in maintaining that a treaty did not require consent of the House. Washington said that in the Journal of the
Convention it appeared " 'that no Treaty should be binding on the United States which was not
ratified by a law,' and that the proposition was explicitly rejected." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 8, at
371. Although Madison considered that the meaning of the Constitution was to be sought in the
records of the Ratification Convention rather than in those of the Federal Convention, id. at 518, he
nevertheless turned to the understanding of the Framers, id. at 458,464, 473, 534.
Activists attack the "original intention" because it thwarts their free-wheeling interpretations.
Paul Bator remarks on "the total triumph of a kind of reductionist legal realism, that leads people to
believe that you are entitled to put anything you want in the Constitution." Bator, supra note 20, at
53.
136. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism andNeutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781,786 (1983).
137. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 149,371 (1938).
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the intent and meaning of constitutional provisions." 138 Other commenta1 39
tors concur.
Gibbons' ill-considered foray can draw comfort from the reigning idol
of jurisprudes, Ronald Dworkin, who flatly asserts that "there is no such
thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered." 40 He is
refuted by what Justice Harlan justly described as the "irrefutable and..
* unanswered" evidence 41 for the framers' exclusion of suffrage from
the fourteenth amendment. The pervasive hostility to Negro suffrage is
strikingly exemplified by the 112-to-12 and 34-to-4 votes in the House
and Senate, rejecting attempts to compel Tennessee to embody Negro
suffrage in its Constitution. 142 Here are indubitable "intentions."
Weighing the alternatives, Mark Tushnet observed that the interpretivist view that "we are indeed better off being bound by the dead hand of
the past than being subjected to the whims of willful judges trying to
make the Constitution live . . .[is] 'fairly powerful.' "143 Feeble are the
arguments to the contrary. As said by Justice Harlan, "[wihen the Court
disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers [as with
segregation and suffrage], it has invaded the realm of the political process
to which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which is its highest duty to protect." 44 Activists may
flatter themselves that they have buried the "intention" doctrine, but the
corpse sprang to life in the Court's recent legislative chaplain case:
"Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment religion clause did not
view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that
45
amendment."1

138. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL. HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME COURT 128 (1971).
139. E.g., Jones. The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and American Variations, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY l 01. 102. 134 (H. Jones ed. 1976).
140. Dworkin, The Forian of Principle. 56 N.Y.U. L. REv 469.477 (1981).
141. Supra text accompanying note 43.
142. Supra text accompanying note 41.
143. Tushnet. supra. note 136. at 787. The theory. interpretivism. that the Court is not empowered to revise the Constitution. says Thomas Grey. a devout activist, is "'of great power and
compelling simplicity ... deeply rooted in our history and ... in our formal constitutional law...
the theory upon which judicial review was founded in Marbrv v. Madison." Grey. Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN L. REV 703.705 (1975).
144. Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S. 112. 203 (1970) (dissenting in part). Henry Monaghan insists
"that any theory of constitutional interpretation which renders unimportant or irrelevant questions as
to the original intent. solar as that intent can be fairly discerned. is not. given our tradition. politically or intellectually defensible." Monaghan. The Constitution Goes to Harvard. 13 HARV C R.C.L.L. REv 117.124(1978).
145. Marsh v. Chambers. 103 S. Ct. 3330.3334 (1983).
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GeneralLanguage

B.

Activists rely heavily on the "general" terms employed in the Constitution as an "invitation" to judicial legislation. The argument will be
considered first in the 1787 setting and then in the 1866 setting of the
fourteenth amendment.
1.

1787

Amongst the "circumstantial evidence that the framers authorized interpreters of the Constitution to make value judgments that are not necessarily analogous to the framers' own particular value judgments," Gary
Leedes points to Carl Friedrich's statement that in the eighteenth century
norms were considered "the more important and valuable, the more general they were." 146 Yet Samuel Adams wrote that" [v]ague and uncertain
laws, and more especially constitutions, are the very instruments of slavery. "147 One of the Framers, Rufus King, told the Massachusetts Convention that the Federal Convention sought "to use those expressions that
were . . . least equivocal in their meaning .

. .

. We believe that the

powers are clearly defined, the expressions as free from ambiguity as the
Convention could form them .... ",148 Understandably, Madison wrote
that "it exceeds the possibility of belief, that the known advocates in the
Convention for a jealous grant & cautious definition of federal powers,
should have silently permitted the introduction of words or phrases in a
sense rendering fruitless the restrictions & definitions elaborated by
50
them." 149 Men do not use words to defeat their purpose. 1
Nevertheless, John Hart Ely regards the ninth amendment as an openended provision, "intended to signal the existence of federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution." 5 1 "[R]ead for what it says," he avers, "the Ninth Amendment
seems open-textured enough to support almost anything one might wish
to argue, and that thought can get pretty scary.' 1 52 An "open-ended"
grant that scares Ely across the gap of 200 years can hardly be laid at the
door of the Founders, to many of whom the federal courts were suspect. 153 The ninth amendment provides, "It]he enumeration in the
146.
(1983).
147.
148.
149.
150.

Leedes, A Critique of IllegitimateNoninterpretivism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 533, 552, 553
3 S. ADAMS. WRITINGS 262 (H. Cushing ed. 1904).
3 M. FARRAND, supranote 8, at 268.
Id. at 488.
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941).

151.

J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 38 (1980).

152.
153.

Id. at 34.
R. BERGER, CONGRESS V.THE SUPREME COURT 263-64 (1969).
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Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." Madison made clear that the retained
rights were not "assigned" to the federal government, emphasizing that
154
they constitute an area in which the "[g]overnment ought not to act."
Ely himself observes, "[o]ne thing we know to a certainty from the historical context is that the Ninth Amendment was not designed to grant
Congress authority to create additional rights, to amend Article I,Section
8 by adding a general power to protect rights," pointing out that the
phrase "others retained by the people" is not "an apt way of saying 'others Congress may create.' 1155 What Congress may not "create" also
lies outside the judicial province. Madison left no doubt that the "great
object" of a Bill of Rights was to "limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the
Government ought not to act or to act only in a particular mode."1 56 It
perverts meaning to read the retention of unenumerated rights as a grant
of "open-ended" power.
2.

1866

Instead of meeting the undeniable exclusion of suffrage, for example,
activists rely on the generality of the fourteenth amendment's language.
Thus Gary Leedes considers that "[t]he loose language of the fourteenth
amendment . . . was a standing invitation for innovative interpretation." 157 So too, Ely asserts that its framers issued "open and across-theboard invitations to import into the constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in the amendment nor [sic] even . . . elsewhere in the Constitution."'158 For him the "Privileges or Immunities"
154. 1 ANNALS OF CONG 439. 437 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836) (print bearing running title "History of Congress").
155. J. ELY, supra note 144, at 37.
156.

1 ANNALS OF CONG , supra note 154, at 437. What the Supreme Court said of the tenth

amendment equally applies to the ninth: the Framers intended that:
[ilf
in the future further powers seemed necessary they should be granted by the people in the
manner they had provided for amending that [organic] act.
. .. [Aifter making provision for an amendment to the Constitution by which any needed
additional powers would be granted, they reserved to themselves all powers not so delegated.
Kansas v. Colorado. 206 U.S. 46. 90 (1907).
157. Leedes, supra note 146, at 556. But compare Justice Harlan: "The general statements by
Bingham and Stevens to the effect that the Amendment was designed to achieve equality. . . do not
weaken the force of the statements specifically addressed to the suffrage question." Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U. S. 112, 186 n.54 (1970). The specific governs the general.
158.

Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility. 53 IND L.J. 399. 415

(1978). Such theorizing is dismissed by Larry Alexander. as "some dubious invitation from the
Framers to transcend the specific values [and limitations) they embodied in various constitutional
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clause is "inscrutable," and the "Equal Protection" clause no more
forthcoming. 159 He is aware, moreover, that "vague and untethered
standards inevitably lend themselves to the virtually irresistible temptation to intervene when one's political or moral sensitivities are sufficiently affronted."1 60 His attribution to the framers of an intention to issue such an invitation to the Court is at war with his recognition that the
Dred Scott (and fugitive slave cases) had "spilled over into a general distrust of the institution of judicial review." 16 1 In truth, the framers bitterly
resented the Court's intrusion into "settlement of political questions
which," said John Bingham, "it has no more right to decide for the
American people than has the Court of St. Petersburg."' 162 In consequence, they confided enforcement of the amendment to Congress, not
the Court; section 5 provides "Congress shall have power to enforce...
"This is incompatible with a free rein to read judicial predilections into
the amendment. Now to examine the several clauses.
a. Due Process
Leedes' reference to the "loose language" of the amendment is paralwho label the due process clause, for instance, as
leled by others
''vague." 163 To the extent that it is 'vague," it is because the Court has
made it so. On the eve of the Convention, Hamilton stated that "[t]he
words, 'due process' have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice." 164 Charles
clauses." Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: NoniterpretiveJudicialReview. 8 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 447 (1983).
159. J. ELY, supranote 151, at 98.
160. Ely, supranote 158, at 403.
161. Id. at448.
162. 6 C. FAIRMAN. HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME COURTOFTHE UNITED STATES 462 (1971).
163. F. FRANKFURTER. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (2d. ed. 1961):
"phrases like 'due process of law' fare]... of 'convenient vagueness.' '
164. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962). Two English
scholars who presumably are familiar with English legal institutions are in accord with Hamilton.
Lord Beloff wrote, due process of law "was transformed from an apparently procedural limitation
into one of substance.., from a statement that some things should be done only in a particular way
[judicial proceedings] to a statement that some things could not be done at all even by legislation."
M. BELOFF. supra note 1, at 48. Denis Brogan referred to the "astonishingly wide meaning given to
'due process of law,' " which "has come to mean anything that a majority of the Court has found
contrary to its sense of natural justice and enlightened reason.- D. BROGAN. THE CRISIS OF AMERIAN
FEDERALISM 32 (1944) (footnotes omitted). For a study of English antecedents see Berger. "Law of
the Land" Reconsidered. 74 Nw. U.L. REV. I (1979). In a classic work. Charles G. Haines wrote
that due process of law "referred in England to a method of procedure in criminal trials." and that
when the term was "inserted in the American state constitutions it was accepted with the usual English significance" and "chiefly used as a protection to individuals against summary and arbitrary
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Curtis, an admirer of the Court's transformation of due process. wrote
that the meaning of the fifth amendment's due process of law "was as
fixed and definite as the common law could make a phrase ....
It meant a
procedural process.' 16 5 In the fourteenth amendment the words were
"used in the same sense and with no greater extent," 166 as the legislative
history confirms. Ely found no references that gave the fourteenth's
clause "more than a procedural connotation. "167 The framers did not
view "due process" as a "vague" term but one of fixed and narrow

meaning. 168
b.

Privileges or Immunities

The words "privileges and immunities" are first met in article IV of
the Articles of Confederation: "the people of the different states ... shall
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several
states," specifying "all the privileges of trade or commerce." 169 For the
Founders, the enumerated "privileges of trade or commerce" qualified
the general words "privileges and immunities. " 170 The latter words were
picked up by article IV of the Constitution, and very early the courts of
Maryland and Massachusetts construed them in terms of trade and commerce. 17' The words came into the fourteenth amendment via the Civil
Rights Bill of 1866, which referred to "civil rights and immunities."172
After reading from the cases, Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that "[t]he great fundamental rights
executive action," and "'not regarded as a check on legislative authority." C. HAINES. THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 410 (1959).
165. Curtis, Review and Majority Rule. in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 170. 177 (E
Cahn ed. 1954). "When the Fifth Amendment was added to the Constitution in 1792. no one .. had
ever suggested that the term 'due process of law' had any other than its anciently established and selfevident meaning of correct procedure .... " E. CORWIN. THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 95
(1934). The "modem doctrine of due process of law . . . could never have been laid down except in
defiance of history." Id. at 118-19.
166. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
167. Ely, supra note 158, at 288. R. BERGER. supra note 4, at 201-06.
168. James Garfield, a framer of the fourteenth amendment, explained in 1871 that due process
of law meant "an impartial trial according to the law of the land." CONG GLOBE. 42d Cong.. Ist
Sess. 152-53 (1871).
169. H. COMMAGER. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (7th ed. 1963).
170. Madison wrote:
[F]or what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others
were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common
than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.
THE FEDERALIST No 41, at 269 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941).
171. Campbell v. Morris. 3 H.&McH. 535 (Md. 1797): Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89 (Mass.
1827).
172. Section I of the bill is set out in CONG- GLOBE. 39th Cong.. Ist Sess. 474 (1866).
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set forth in this bill [are] the right to acquire property, the right to...
make contracts, and to inherit and dispose of property," 173 the very rights
the Black Codes denied.1 74 Even so, John Bingham, draftsman of the
amendment, protested that "civil rights and immunities" was "oppressive" and so broad as to encroach on the province of the states. 175 So the
phrase was deleted in order to obviate a "construction going beyond the
specific rights named in the section," a "latitudinarian construction not
intended.' 1 76 In substituting the narrower word "privileges" for
"rights" in the amendment, Bingham hardly embraced the "latitudinarian construction" he had denounced. 177 Justice Bradley declared in 1870
that "the first section of the bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth
179
amendment. "178 That ground, the Supreme Court stated, was narrow.
By virtue of judicial construction, recognized by the framers, the
words "privileges and immunities" had become words of art. Judge William Lawrence, regarded by his congressional fellows as a scholarly lawyer, observed that "the courts have by construction limited the words 'all
privileges' to mean only 'some privileges.' ",180 On the basis of much
thinner evidence, the Court, per Justice Harlan, declared, "we should not
assume that Congress ...used the words 'advocate' and 'teach' in their
ordinary dictionary meanings when they had already been construed as
terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation. 1181
173. Id. at 475.
174. The Black Codes "excluded blacks from voting, owning land, making contracts, securing
access to the courts, working without a license, travelling without a pass, or engaging in certain
trades." Dimond, Strict Constructionand JudicialReview of Racial DiscriminationUnder the Equal
Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462, 474
(1982).
175. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866).
176. Id. at 1366, 1367.
177. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). Justice Harlan pointed out that in the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Bingham was "successful in replacing § 1 of Owen's proposal,
which read: 'No discrimination . . . as to the civil rights' with the . . . 'abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens' " avowedly borrowed from article IV. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
172(1970).
178. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter
House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649,655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
179. The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to protect a
limited category of rights.... [Tihe Senate bill did contain a general provision forbidding "discrimination in civil rights or immunities," preceding the specific enumeration of rights.... Objections
were raised in the legislative debates to the breadth of the rights of social equality that might be
encompassed by a prohibition so general .... [A]n amendment was accepted [in the House] striking
the phrase from the bill.
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791-92 (1966).
180. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1835 (1866).
181. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 391 (1957). Chief Justice Taney stated, "The members of the Convention unquestionably used the words they inserted in the Constitution in the same
sense in which they used them in their debates." The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 477
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EqualProtection of the Laws

Unlike its companion clauses, "equal protection of the laws" had no
antecedents. In such a case, Senator Charles Sumner counselled the framers that if the meaning of the Constitution is "in any place open to doubt,
or if words are used which seem to have no fixed significance, we cannot
err if we turn to the framers." 182 Such were the views of his fellows in the
Reconstruction Congress, summarized by a "unanimous Senate Judiciary
Report, signed by Senators who had voted for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments," 183 the subject being the fourteenth:
A construction which should give the phrase . . a meaning different from
the sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when they
adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from
the plain and express language of the Constitution. . .This is the rule of
interpretation adopted by all commentators on the Constitution, and in all
84
judicial expositions of that instrument. 1
Mark that the Report considered the Framers' intention as weighty as the
text, and, as Chief Justice Marshall had laid down, the meaning the words
had for the Framers was to be given effect. 185 That meaning is scarcely
open to doubt; emphatically it was not expressive of uncircumscribed,
boundless equality. Time and again the Framers had rejected proposals to
ban all discrimination. 186 Throughout the debates on the Civil Rights
Bill-which proceeded on a parallel track with the amendment, which it
was an object of the amendment to incorporate and shield from repeal,
and which without dissent was regarded as identical with the amendment' 8 7 -the framers associated equal protection with the narrow group
of rights the bill enumerated. One example must suffice: Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio said, "whatever rights as to each of the enumerated civil
(not political) matters the States may confer upon one race . . . shall be
held by all races in equality ...It [the bill] secures equality of protection
in those enumerated civil rights."1 88 If two acts are in pari materia, the
Court held, "it will be presumed that if the same word be used in both,
(1849) (Taney, J., dissenting). See also Marshall, supra text accompanying note 116, and Thompson
v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898).

Sess. 677 (1866).
182. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., Ist
183.
184.

RECONSTRUCTION AMENDS., supra note 40, atii.
S. REP No. 21, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1872), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION AMENDS.

supra note 40, at 57 1.
185. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
186. R. BERGER, supranote 4,at 163-65.
187. Id. at 22-23; see also Justice Bradley, supra text accompanying note 178.
188. 2 CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866); for other citations see R. BERGER.
supra note 4, at 169-71; see also The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 483 (1849) (Taney.
C. J.,dissenting) (quoted supra note 181).
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and a special meaning were given to it in the first act, that it was intended
that it should receive the same interpretation in the latter act, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention." 189 The repeated rejection of proposals to bar all discrimination forecloses a "contrary intention." It strains credulity to impute to Bingham, draftsman of the
amendment, the "oppressive" breadth he had condemned in the bill.
Activists turn their back on such facts and instead descant on the framers' choice of "general" words in place of the enumerated rights of the
bill. This recalls Henry Hart's scathing comment that William Crosskey
"is a devotee of that technique of interpretation which reaches its apogee
of persuasiveness in the triumphant question, 'If that's what they meant,
why didn't they say so?' "190 Enumeration, as Bickel noted, would conduce to the prolixity of a code. 191 Moreover, the framers could rely on the
rule that the words they used would be construed as they understood
them. 192 The issue was summed up in 1974 by Robert Bork:
The words are general but surely that would not permit us to escape the
framers' intent if it were clear. If the legislative history revealed a consensus
about segregation in schooling .... I do not see how the Court could escape
the choices revealed and substitute its own, even though the words are general and conditions have changed.' 93
Judge Learned Hand said of the desegregation decision, "I have never
been able to understand on what basis it does or can rest except as a coup
de main."1 94 The soundness of such views is attested by a remarkable
fact: in an early version of the amendment, provision was made for both
"the same political rights and privileges; and ...equal protection in the
enjoyment of life, liberty, and property," testimony that "equal protection" was not deemed to comprehend "political rights and privi189. Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162, 165 (1871).
190. Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1456, 1462 (1954). Justice Holmes held that when a
legislature "has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed...
. [ilt is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say 'We see what you are driving at. but you
have not said it.' " Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908), quoted in Keifer &
Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 391 n.4 (1939). Activists, moreover, reverse the
burden of proof. Given that by "inscrutable" words they would diminish the rights reserved to the
states by the tenth amendment (see infra. text accompanying notes 191-99) it is incumbent upon
them to prove the intention to curtail. See infra text accompanying notes 193-94.
191. The "specific and exclusive enumeration of rights as appeared in section I of the Civil
Rights Act" presumably was considered inappropriate in a constitutional provision. Bickel, supra
note 54, at 61. A similar proposal in the First Congress led Abraham Baldwin, a Framer, to say that
such minute regulation "would have swelled [the Constitution] to the size of a folio volume." I
ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 154, at 559.
192. Supra text accompanying note 116; The Passenger Cases. 48 U.S. (How.) 283, 477 (1849)
(Taney, C. J., dissenting) (quoted supranote 18 1).
193. Bork, supranote 46, at 13.
194. L. HAND. THE BILLOF RIGHTS 55 (1962).
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leges." 195 When the latter words were deleted, at the instance of John
Bingham, its draftsman, 196 leaving "equal protection" standing alone.
the latter patently did not include the elided "political privileges.'" Now
to insist that "equal protection" includes what unmistakably was excluded, namely suffrage and segregation, is, in the words of Justice
Story, to commit "a fraud" upon the people. 197
Yet another formidable hurdle confronts the "general" words
school-the tenth amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United
States . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

These rights are not to be curtailed under cover of "vague," "inscrutable" words, allegedly justifying judicial intrusion into what was the established province of the States, e.g., suffrage. As Roscoe Conkling. a
member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of both Houses,
stated, "[t]he proposition to prohibit States from denying civil or political
rights to any class of persons, encounters a great objection on the threshold. It trenches upon the principle of existing local sovereignty" and
"meddles with a right reserved to the States." 98 An intention, said Chief
Justice Marshall, "to establish a principle never before recognized,
should be expressed in plain and explicit terms." 199 That requirement
was applied to the fourteenth amendment by Justice Miller, who refused
to "embrace a construction" of the amendment that would subject the
states' local concerns to "the control of Congress

. .

. in the absence of

language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of
doubt."200 In short, an intention to diminish rights reserved by the tenth
amendment must be clearly expressed.
Michael Perry considers, however, that reliance on the tenth amendment is historically unsound, since as Justice Brennan indicated in dissent:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it
was more than declarator, of the relationship between the national and state
195.
196.

Bickel, supra note 54. at 31.
Bingham's instrumentality was noted by Justice Harlan in Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S.

112. 171 (1970).

197. "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief sedulously propagated. that such protection was offered, would it not now be a fraud upon the whole people to give it a different construetion. " 2 J. STORY. supra note 113, § 1084.
198. CONG_ GLOBE. 39th Cong.. Ist Sess. 358 (1866).
199. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 165 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) (No. 14.693): see also Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
200. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872). Justice Frankfurter said this case
"has the authority that comes from contemporaneous knowledge of the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber. 329 U.S. 459. 467 (1947) (Frankfurter. J..
concurring).
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governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment .... 201
A truism is a proposition that "is so obviously true as not to require
discussion." ' 202 Brennan failed to take into account that the tenth was
adopted to put the obvious beyond peradventure; he overlooked that Justice Stone, from whom he borrowed the quotation, went on to say that its
purpose was "to allay fears that the new national government might seek
to exercise powers not granted.'"203 In Alpheus Thomas Mason's more
graphic terms, the opposition "had conjured up the image of a national
colossus, destined to swallow up or destroy the defenseless states. To
quiet these fears, Madison proposed the Tenth Amendment. '204 The reservation, the Court stated, was "made absolutely certain by the Tenth
Amendment" to forestall federal exercise of "powers which had not been
granted.' '205 Consequently, reliance on the tenth as a shield against federal encroachments is strengthened rather than weakened by the fact that
the Founders took the precaution to put into express terms what had rested
on assurances and implications. 206
C.

Open-Ended Terms

Alexander Bickel conceived a subtle variant of the "general" words
and "change of meaning" theories: the Framers meant to leave posterity
free to read into the amendment the suffrage and desegregation they had
excluded. This escaped rejection of the Framers' intention by attributing
to them a theretofore undreamed of intention, an intention that has no
factual foundation. As clerk to Justice Frankfurter, Bickel had informed
him that "it is impossible to conclude that the 39th Congress intended that
segregation be abolished, impossible also to conclude that they foresaw it
might be, under the language they were adopting.' '207 What they did not
foresee they did not authorize.
In a memorandum for his files, Justice Frankfurter, who had concluded
that "in all likelihood, the framers of the amendment had not intended to
201.

M. PERRY. CONSTITUTION. THE COURTS. AND HUMAN RIGHTS 188 n.47 (1982) (emphasis

added).
202. OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICIONARY (1955).203. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
204. Mason, The Bill of Rights: An Almost ForgottenAppendage, in THE FUTURE OF OUR LIBER"iEs47 (S. Halpem ed. 1982).
205. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89-90 (1907).
206. Patrick Henry exclaimed in the Virginia Ratification Convention: "What do they tell us?
That our rights are reserved. Why not say so?" 3 ELLIOT, supranote 65, at 448.
207. R. KLUGER. supranote 9, at 654.
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outlaw segregation,"- 208 asserted that constitutional terms must accommodate "changes in men's feelings," 20 9 so that equal protection could
mean one thing in 1868 and the very opposite in 1954. Writing after his
clerkship, Bickel framed a tentative hypothesis: might not "equal protection" be read to exhibit receptiveness "to 'latitudinarian' construction?"
Bickel concluded that "[n]o one made the point with regard to this particular clause.''210 Noting that Republicans drew back from a 'formulation dangerously vulnerable to attacks pandering to the prejudices of the
people [which they themselves shared]," 211 he speculated that the framers might have resorted to language which they could "defend against
damaging alarms raised by the opposition, but which at the same time
was sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future advances?" 21 2 More
bluntly, Bickel hypothesized that the framers concealed the future objectives they dared not avow lest the whole enterprise be imperilled. There is
not a shred of evidence that the framers employed double-talk to
hoodwink the ratifiers. If they did, there was no ratification, because "If
the material facts be either suppressed or unknown, the ratification is
treated as invalid.' 213
Attribution of such intentions to the framers overlooks that as late as
1875, a Reconstruction Congress, at last ready to bar discrimination in
hotels and transportation facilities, rejected mixed schools because they
would excite prejudice. 2 14 No one mentioned that allegedly concealed authorization in the "open-ended" language. To postulate that in such an
atmosphere of ingrown prejudice the 1866 framers tucked away in the
amendment an authorization to do in futuro what they themselves could
not stomach in the present is sheer fantasy. Bickel's followers overlook
208. Id. 598.
209. Id. 685. But see Chief Justice Cooley. supra note 86. "Men's feelings" had not changed.
Derrick Bell, a black academician, wrote in 1975: "Today opposition to desegregation is. if anything, greater than it was in 1954. " Bell. The Burden of Brown on Blacks: History Based on Observation of a Landmark Decision. 7 N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 25, 25 (1975). Another black. Roy Wilkins.
stated in 1978 that "the attitude of whites toward blacks is basic in this country. And that has changed
for the worse." Wilkins, Racial Outlook: Lack of Change Disturbs Blacks. N.Y. Times. March 3.
1978, at A-26. col. 1.
210. Bickel. supra note 54, at 61 (emphasis added). But compare supra text accompanying note
176.
211. Senator John Sherman of Ohio said in the Senate in 1862. "We do not like negroes. We do
not disguise our dislike." C. Woodward, supra note 5I. George Julian. a radical from neighboring
Indiana, told the House in 1866. "the real trouble is that we hate the Negro." CONG GLOtE, 39th
Cong.. Ist Sess. 257 (1866).
212. Bickel, supra note 54, at 61.
213. Owings v. Hull. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607. 629 (1835) (Story. J.).
214. Senator Aaron Sargent of California said, the common school proposal would reinforce "a
prejudice powerful, permeating every part of the country." 3 CONG REc 4172 (1874). For similar
remarks in the House by Barbour Lewis of Tennessee. see 3 CONG REC 998 (1875). and William
Phelps of New Jersey. id. at 1002.
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that in 1970 Bickel wrote, "[t]he Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
explicitly rejected the option of an open-ended grant of power to Congress freely to meddle with conditions within the states, so as to render
them equal in accordance with Congress's own notions.' '215 This denial
of "open-ended" authority to future Congresses is at odds with its incorporation in the amendment. Congress well knew that its successors also
could enact amendments, as the fifteenth speedily proved. Proof, not
speculation, is required that the framers departed from the article V path
and authorized posterity to interpret their determination to exclude suffrage and segregation as authority to reverse this exclusion. It remains to
be said that a candid activist, seeking to clear away the underbrush of
"theories," wrote that Berger "devastated the notion that the framers of
the fourteenth amendment ...intended it to be 'open-ended.' "216
D.

The ConstitutionMust Grow

The "truly difficult question," Michael Perry considers, is "whether
the original understanding of important power limiting provisions like the
first and fourteenth amendments-the plainly narrow original understandings-ought, as a matter of constitutional theory, to be deemed the only
legitimate sources of norms for constitutional adjudication." And he cites
Gerald Lynch's argument for "institutional growth beyond the original
understanding.'" 217 This bland rhetoric masks a plea for judicial power to
erase constitutional limits. Very early Justice Marshall declared that a
written Constitution was designed to limit power and asked: "To what
purpose are powers limited ...if these limits may, in any time be passed
b, those intended to be restrained?" 218 Later he specifically disclaimed a
judicial right to change the instrument. 2 19 The notion that a Constitution
so limited could be made to "grow" by the judiciary is refuted by the
evidence, which here can only be summarized: (1) The Founders' belief
in a fixed Constitution of unchanging meaning, alterable only by the people through the process of amendment; (2) the avowedly inferior place of
the judiciary in the federal scheme, deriving from suspicion of the innovative judicial review by judges who theretofore had been regarded with
"aversion;" (3) the Founders' profound distrust of judicial discretion; (4)
their attachment to the separation of powers and their insistence that
215. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURTAND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 48 (1977).
216. Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685,695 (1978).
217. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 311 (1981).
218. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137, 176 (1803).
219. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.MARYLAND 185 (G. Gunther ed. 1969). See
also J. STORY, supra note 113.
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courts should not engage in policymaking but rather act solely as interpreters, not makers, of the law; (5) Hamilton, foremost advocate of judicial
review, iterated that there "is no liberty, if the power of judging be not
separated from the legislative and executive powers. " That he did not
mean to authorize the judiciary to take over legislative functions is demonstrated by his statement that courts may not "on pretense of a repugnancy ... substitute their own pleasure for the constitutional intentions of
the legislature." James Iredell, himself a powerful advocate of judicial
review, put the matter unequivocally: within their constitutional boundaries legislatures are not controllable by the courts. And Hamilton assured
the Ratifiers that judges could be impeached for deliberate usurpations on
the authority of the legislature; and (6) The Founders' jealous attachment
of states' rights and suspicion of federal courts, evidenced by the First
Congress' grant of exclusive "arising under" jurisdiction to the state
courts, is incompatible with the theory that courts could make the Consti220
tution grow at the cost of the states' reserved rights.
The foregoing greatly telescoped review of activist arguments should
persuade that they are merely a facade concocted, as Leonard Levy observed, "to rationalize a growing satisfaction with judicial review among
liberal intellectuals and scholars," 221 a satisfaction growing out of the
Court's gratification of desires the people would not satisfy. 222 The contra-activist doctrine-interpretivism, to borrow from Raymond Aron,
"justifies itself by the falseness of the beliefs that oppose it. "223
E.

The Role of The Court

No activist has cited a constitutional provision that authorizes the Court
to revise the Constitution, in Justice Black's scornful phrase, to keep it
"in tune with the times." 224 Such an authorization, Perry justly observes.
220.

For detailed discussion and citations, see Ber2er, Michael Perrv's Functional Justification

for JudicialActivism. 8 U. DAYTON L. REV 465. 523-27 (1983).

22 1. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 24 (L. Levy ed. 1967). Mark Tushnet notes that
activists are "'eager to superimpose a facade of rationality on the Courtfs decisions." Tushnet. Truth.
Justice and tite American Way: An Interpretation of Public Scholarship in the Seventies. 57 Tt \. L.

REV 1307. 1325 (1979). Federalism implies "a legally immutable constitution," A. DicI-¥. INTRO
DUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION 142 (7th ed. 1903). as is confirmed by the article V
provision that "no state ... shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."
222. See Bishop. infra text accompanying note 255.
223. Aron. Pensees, N.Y. Times, October 23, 1983 at E-19, col. I. Interpretivism. unlike activism. was not recently fabricated to rationalize the Court's illegitimate decisions, but as activist
Thomas Grey wrote it is "deeply rooted in our history and in our shared principles of political legitimacy. It has equally deep roots in our formal constitutional law.
...Grey. Do We Have ali
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703. 705 (1975). Grey recognizes that the opposing view
is more difficult to justify. Id. at 708.
224. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479. 522 (1965) (Black, J.. dissenting).
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"would have been a remarkable delegation for politicians to grant an institution like the Supreme Court, given the electorates' longstanding commitment to policymaking . . . by those accountable unlike the Court, to
the electorate.' '22 It would also have been an unexplained departure from
the long judicial tradition excluding judges from lawmaking. Samuel
Thorne tells us that Bracton wrote his treatise in 1250 because there had
been found judges "who decide cases according to their own will rather
than by the authority of the laws." ' 226 Hundreds of years later Francis
Bacon counselled judges "to remember that their office is to interpret the
law, and not to make it. "227 Just before our Revolution, Blackstone condemned "arbitrary judges" whose decisions are "regulated only by their
own opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law" which
"judges are bound to observe. "228
Recognition of those bounds is evidenced by the statement of Justice
James Wilson in his 1791 Philadelphia Lectures: the judge "will remember, that his duty and his business is, not to make the law, but to interpret
and apply it.'"229 Policymaking was emphatically considered out of judicial bounds as is evidenced by the Framers' rejection of the Justices' participation in a Council of Revision. It had been proposed that they should
assist the President in exercising the veto power on the ground that
"[1]aws may be. . .unwise, may be dangerous ...and yet not be so
unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect. ' ' 230 But Elbridge Gerry objected: "It was quite foreign from the
nature of ye office to make them judges of the policy of public measures." 23 1 Nathaniel Gorhum said judges "are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of . . . public measures;" 232 and John

225. M. PERRY, supra note 201, at 20. Perry considers that the principle of electorally accountable policymaking is "axiomatic; it is judicial reivew, not that principle, that requires justification."
Id. at9.
226. BRACrON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 19 (S. Thome, translator, 1968).
227. J. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 327 (1953).
228. 1 W. BLAcKSToNE, supra note 26, at 269. Chief Justice Mansfield stated, "Whatever
doubts I may have in my own breast with respect to the policy and expediency of this law... I am
bound to see it executed according to its meaning." Pray v. Edie, 99 E.R. 1113, 1114 (1786).
229. 2 JAMES WILSON, WORKS 502 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). That was often repeated by the
Court: "It is the province of a court to expound the law, not to make it." Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1, 41 (1849) (Taney, C.J.); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874)
("Our province is to decide what the law is, not to declare what it should be") (Waite, C.J.). In
Houston v. Moore, U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 48 (1820), Justice Story emphasized, "[W]e are not at liberty
to add one jot of power to the national government beyond what the people have granted by the
constitution .. "
230. 2 M. FARRAND, supranote 8, at 73.
231. 1M. FARRAND, supranote 8, at 97-98.
232. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 8, at 73.
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Dickinson stated that judges "ought not to be legislators. 2 33 As Edward
Corwin concluded, "The first important step in the clarification of the
Convention's ideas with reference to the doctrine of judicial review is
marked, therefore, by its rejection of the Council of Revision idea on the
basis of the principle . . . '[T]hat the power of making ought to be kept
distinct from that of expounding the law.' "234 A leading activist, Charles
Black, confirms that for the colonists, "The function of the judge was
thus placed in sharpest antithesis to that of the legislator," who alone was
235
concerned "with what the law ought to be."
Two other factors fed into this dichotomy. The Founders had a "profound fear of judicial independence and discretion,"236 given colorful
utterance by Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts: "the Judge
should never be the Legislator: Because, then the Will of the Judge would
be the Law: and this tends to a State of Slavery.' 237 Such sentiments
were inspired by some sorry English history, epitomized by Lord Camden: "The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants .. .In the best of
times it is often caprice . . in the worst, it is every vice, folly and passion, to which human nature is liable."238 Then there was the fact that
colonial judges, often unsympathetic to expanding democratarianism,
were saddled on the colonists by the Crown, so that Justice James Wilson
did not find it surprising in 1791 that judges "were objects of aversion
and distrust."239 To give the last word on policy to judges, therefore,
would not only have been a "remarkable delegation," it would have required a repudiation of established and cherished tradition. Instead, as
Hamilton assured the Ratifiers, judicial authority was confined to "certain cases particularlyspecified. The expression of those cases marks the
precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot extend their jurisdiction .... ."240 Concretely, jurisdiction of cases "arising under" the
Constitution implicitly excludes cases that do not "arise" thereunder, for
instance, cases in which the Court has fashioned rights not conferred by
233.
1 M. FARRAND. supra note 8. at 108.
234. E. CORWIN. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVI-W 42 (1963).
235. C. BLACK. THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 160 (1960): compare also supra text accompanying
notes 227-33. See also R. BERGER. CONGRESS V. TIlE SUPREME COURT. Index "Expounding the

Law" (1969).
236.

Wood. supra note 9. at 298.

237.

Horwitz. The Emergence ofan InstrtumentalConception ofAmerican Law, 1780-1820. in 5

PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287. 292 (1971). Hutchinson echoed Montesquieu. the oracle of
the Founders. who had written that if the judges were to be the Legislators. "the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control." de Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws, in 38 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 70 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952).
238. Quotedb vJustice Brennan in McGautha v. California. 402 U.S. 183. 257 (19711.
239.
I JAMES WILSON. WORKS 292 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
240. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 at 541 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941 ) (emphasis added).
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the Constitution, thereby taking over powers reserved to the States. 24 1
Similarly, the article V provision for amendment by the people according
to prescribed procedure 242 precludes amendment by the Court. Even the
legislature, darling of the Founders-in contrast to the judiciary which,
Hamilton assured the Ratifiers, "was next to nothing" 243-cannot
change the Constitution, for as Madison said, "it would be a novel &
dangerous doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under
which it held its existence." 244 Its attempt to do so was rejected in Marbury v. Madison: Congress is not empowered to enlarge the jurisdiction
of the Court: "[N]o organ of the government may alter [the Constitu245
tion's] terms."
The traditional rule was reiterated by Chief Justice Taney: "It is the
province of the court to expound the law, and not to make it," as Chief
Justice Waite later reaffirmed. 246 Robert Bork pointedly commented:
"The Supreme Court regularly insists that its results . . . do not spring
from the mere will of the Justices in the majority but are supported, indeed compelled, by a proper understanding of the Constitution ....
Value choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers, not to the
Court.' '247 Even Chief Justice-Warren piously intoned that "[tihe' provisions of the Constitution ...are vital, living principles that authorize and
limit governmental power . . . .They are the rules of government.'"248
The activists' extravagant rationalizations on its behalf have never been
voiced by the Court. In a similar context, Bork wrote, "It should give
theorists of the open-ended Constitution pause ...that not even the most
activist courts have ever grounded their claims for legitimacy" on such
241. For citations see Berger, Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence
Sager's "Court-Stripping" Polemic, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 615 n.44 (1983).
242. Article V was the "mode preferred by the convention" for alterations. THE FEDERALIST No.
43 at 286 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941). James Wilson noted that the parallel Pennsylvania Constitution
"cannot be amended by any other mode than that which it directs .... 2 ELLIOT, supra note 65, at
457. In the Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jarvis observed that article V furnishes "an adequate provision for all the purposes of political reformation." Id. at 116. That Article, Richard Law
said in Connecticut, "provides a remedy for whatever defects [the Constitution] may have." Id. at
200. "It is not the function of courts or legislative bodies.., to alter the method [for change] which
the Constitution has fixed." Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920); see also supra note 155.
Louis Lusky, an admirer of the activist Court, observes that the Court asserts the "power to revise the
Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by article V." Lusky,
supranote 14, at 406.
243. THE FEDERALIST No.78 at 504 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941) (quoting Montesquieu).
244. 2 M. FARRAND, supranote 8,at 92, 93.
245. E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHTOFTHE SUPREME COURT 110 (1934) (emphasis added).
246. See supra note 228.
247. Bork, supranote 46, at 3-4.
248. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958). That said, he proceeded to upend the rules; see
Berger, supranote 91, at 116-22.
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arguments. 249 I cannot improve on Brest's plea to academe "simply to
acknowledge that most of our writings [about judicial review] are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the court to adopt our various notions of the public

good.
III.

'250

CONCLUSION

The argument for judicial activism-resort to extra-constitutional
values-is fundamentally flawed: it is counter-majoritarian, hence,
as Perry observed, "the recurring embarrassment of the noninterpretivists: majoritarian democracy is, they know, the core of our entire system .... ,,251 Earlier academe was deeply imbued with faith in majorities, but as Arthur Sutherland explained with admirable candor, a
"change of political theory developed" deriving from "Hitler's popularity among the German people, public support of the Un-American Activities Committee and the McCarthy hearings" and the like. "[V]otaries of
unreviewed majoritarianism" suddenly realized that "unrestricted majorities could be as tyrannical as wicked oligarchs . . . We could not say in
plain terms that occassionally we have to select wise and able people and
give them the constitutional function of countering the democratic process . .
"252 Again a gift from the omnipresent "we"!253 But as Myres
McDougal wrote some years ago, "Government by a self-designated elite-like that of benevolent despotism of Plato's philosopher kings-may
be a good form of government for some peoples, but it is not the Ameri-

can way. "254
No intellectual can but from time to time be disappointed by the vox
populi, but as Winston Churchill remarked, the alternatives to democracy
are even worse. Activism, it needs to be underscored, must be understood
as a flight from democratic self-government. As Joseph Bishop wrote,
"those who favor abortion, busing. . . and oppose capital punishment...
have no faith whatever in the wisdom or will of the great majority of the
249. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution. 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
695. 697.
250. Brest, supra note 108, at 1109.
25 1. M. PERRY. supra note 201, at 125 (quoting J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW).

252. Sutherland, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 MICH L. REv 283, 283-84 (1965) (emphasis added). Earlier, "the Progressive realists viewed the policy-making function of judges as deviant in a
democratic society ...

they preferred policy evolved through the political process." A. BICKEL, THE

22-23 (1970).
See Cover, supra text accompanying note 13.

SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

253.

254. McDougal & Lans, Treaties amid Congressional-Executiveor PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable Instruments of NationalPolicy. 54 YALE L.J. 181,578 (1945).
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people, who are opposed to them." 255 Hence, their appeal to the courts.
Because the course of Demos is at times mistaken, even woefully wrong,
it does not follow that the Court is empowered to save the people from
themselves. A seminal constitutional scholar, James Bradley Thayer,
considered that the Court "cannot rightly attempt to protect the people,
by undertaking a function not its own.' '256 A judge, wrote Cardozo, "is
not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or
of goodness." 257 In saltier terms, Holmes said, "if my country wants to
go to hell, I am here to help it. ' ' 258 With Lincoln, I cling to faith in the
ultimate good sense of the people; I cannot subscribe to the theory that
America needs a savior in the shape of nine-ofttimes only five-Platonic Guardians.
The "very notion of the rule of law," Tushnet rightly states, is "at
issue." 259 "[W]e generally agree," said Philip Kurland, that "we are all
to be governed by the same preestablished rules and not by the whim of
those charged with executing those rules .... [F]rom the beginning [the
Court] assumed the role ... of keeper of the rule of law as embodied in
the Constitution." 260 Governance by whim2 6 ' is freshly illustrated by the
Court's recent legislative chaplain decision. "Clearly," Chief Justice
Burger stated, "the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clause
did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation
of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has
continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress." ' 262 By parity of reasoning, the Court's resort to the "cruel and
unusual punishments" clause for its strictures on death penalties is untenable. From 1689 when the English employed the phrase in their Bill of
255. Bishop, What is a Liberal-Who is a Conservative?, 62 COMMENTARY 47 (1976). Richard
Kluger, an admiring chronicler of Brown v. Board of Education, noted that "the whole issue of
segregation came to the courts because the other parts of government, and certainly our private society, were unwilling to face it," quoted in M. PERRY, supra note 201. at 211 n.9 1. Jefferson wrote
Madison on December 20, 1783, "it is my principle that the will of the majority should always
prevail." Mason, supra note 9, at 169. It is not, wrote Dean Charles E. Clark. "a sound and practical
theory... suited to an independent people, to hold that control and direction of its future should be
committed to an aloof judicial tribunal." E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT Xix
(1934).
256. J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 109 (1901).
257.
258.

B. CARDOZO, THE NATUREOFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921).
F. BIDDLE. JUSTICE HOLMES, NATURAL LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT 9 (1961).

259. Tushnet, supra note 107, at 811.
260. Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts "To Say
What tile Law Is". 23 AUz L. REv. 581, 582-83 (1981). To "engage in result-oriented adjudication," Leonard Levy wrote, is to leave "far behind the idea of the rule of law enforced by impersonal
and impartial judges." L. LEVY. AGAINSTTHE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 438

(1974).
261.
262.

See Tushnet, supra text accompanying note 143.
Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3334.
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Rights, through 1789 when it was incorporated in the Eighth Amendment, through 1976 when the Court first discovered that death penalties
violated the phrase, such penalties, with not a single exception, were not
deemed to be within "cruel and unusual punishments." 263 Nevertheless
the Court overturned the centuries-old practice but now exalts the identical 200-year old chaplain practice on the very grounds which dictated
hands off death penalties.
Who are the demigods to whom activists would turn over our governance? For the most part they are political accidents, as was Chief Justice
Warren himself, ranging, with a few exceptions, from mediocre to competent, 264 who, a perfervid activist states, have not been prepared "for
the task of constitutional interpretation.' He states that few have "broadgauged approach and knowledge" essential "to search for and identify
the values that should be sought in constitutional adjudication."- 265 Another activist, Owen Fiss, explains that judges "are lawyers, but in terms
of personal characteristics they are no different from successful businessmen or politicians. Their capacity to make a special contribution to our
social life derives not from any personal knowledge, but from the definition of the office in which they find themselves and through which they
exercise power. "266 Elevation to the Bench thus resembles the medieval
anointment with Holy Oil that clothed the emperor with "a mandate from
heaven." "Time has proved," wrote then-Solicitor General Robert H.
Jackson, that the Court's "judgment was wrong on the most outstanding
issues upon which it has chosen to challenge the popular branches. "267
Terrance Sandalow, an activist, wrote that the developments of 200 years
have "strength[ened] belief in the wisdom of the framers' intentions," 268
whereas already, even to the eyes of his admiring biographer, Chief Justice Warren's choices "appear less as ordained principles of justice and
more as vulnerable policy judgments,"269 judgments the Constitution left
to the people's elected legislative representatives, or to the people themselves.
Let it be assumed that the morals of a high-minded Court are superior
to those of the commonality;2 70 it is nevertheless not authorized to cram
263.

Supra text accompanying notes 92-100.

264.

For citations see Berger, supra note 220, at 480-81.

265.

Miller, The Elusive Search for Values in Constitutional Interpretation, 6 HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 487, 507 (1979).
266. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice. 93 HARv L. REv 1, 12 (1979) (emphasis added).
267.

R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 37 (1941). For academicians' con-

currence,
268.
269.
270.

see Berger, supra note 4, at 331 n.66.
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH L. REV 1033. 1062 (1981).
G. WHITE, supra note 34. at 349.
The philosopher Thomas Nagel observes that "a radical division of opinion" (e.g. about
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them down the throats of the people, as is the case with death penalties,
school prayer and the like. When the Court does for the people "what
they have not chosen to do for themselves," Justice Story declared, "[i]t
is usurping the function of a legislator, ' 271 and as Justice Harlan underscored, "it has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest
duty to protect.' '272 And it has sanctified the deplorable example of the
pre-1937 Court, an endorsement activists may yet have cause to regret.
They have forgotten Cardozo's wise caution: the judges' "individual
sense of justice . . . might result in a benevolent despotism if the judges
were benevolent men. It would put an end to the reign of law.' '273
An excellent homily, encapsulating the points I have been making, was
recently delivered by the court in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger.
True, it is addressed to Congress' use of the legislative veto, but its principles apply equally to the Court itself: the Framers divided the government "into three defined categories . . . to assure, as nearly as possible,
that each Branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility." The "carefully defined limits on the power of each branch
must not be eroded." And he emphasized, "we have not yet found a
better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power
subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitu275
tion." 274 Physician, heal thyself.

abortion, death penalties), indicates that we have "a case of basic moral uncertainty." Nagel, The
Supreme CourtandPoliticalPhilosophy. 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 519, 523-24(1981).
271. 1 J. STORY. supranote 113, at § 426.
272. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970).
273. B. CARDOZO, supranote 257, at 136.
274. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
275. In 1934 Edward Corwin adjured the Court "to give over attempting to supervise national
legislative policies on the basis of a super-constitution which, in the name of the Constitution, repeals
and destroys that historic document." E. CORWIN, supra note 245, at 182. That admonition may be
underscored today, particularly as regards the Court's invasion of rights to control local concerns
which the tenth amendment reserves to the States.
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APPENDIX
Contemporary Constructions of the Fourteenth Amendment Respecting
Segregating
Contemporary constructions carry great weight. Justice William Johnson considered it a "presumption that the contemporaries of the constitution have claims to our deference ... because they had the best opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding of the framers of the
constitution, and of the sense put upon it by the people, when it was

adopted by them.'

'276

Most of the post-Civil War decisions cite Roberts v. City of Boston,
decided in 1849 by the Massachusetts Court,2 77 per Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw, a preeminent state court judge. The case was argued by Charles
Sumner on behalf of a black child who had been excluded from a neighborhood school for whites. He urged that under the Massachusetts constitution all persons "are equal before the law''278 and that the separate
schools denied equality. The School Committee had concluded that the
good of both classes would be best promoted, by maintaining the separate
primary schools for colored and for white children; and the Court held
279
that the rule was "founded on just grounds of reason and experience."
Following suit, the Ohio Supreme Court stated in 1850: "As a matter
of policy it is unquestionably better that the white and colored youth
should be placed in separate schools .... ."280 When the fourteenth
amendment was invoked in 1871, the Ohio Court declared that "Equality
of rights does not involve the necessity of educating white and colored
persons in the same school .... .,281 In 1872 the Nevada Supreme Court
held that separate schools do not offend the fourteenth amendment, 282 and
so it was held by the California court in 1874, passing on an act of
1870.283 In 1874, the Indiana court held that the Constitution does not
empower Congress "to exercise a general or special supervision over the
28 4
states on the subject of education."
The earlier cases were cited by Judge William B. Woods. soon to be
276. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827); see also Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S.
(I Cranch) 299, 309 (1803); Cohens v. Virginia. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264. 418 (1821).
277. 59 Mass. (5 Cushing) 198 (1849).
278. Id. at201.
279. Id.at209-10.
280. State v. Cincinnati, 19 Oh. Rep. 178. 198 (1850).
281. State exrel. Gaines v. McCann. 21 Oh. St. 198,211 (1871).
282. State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy. 7 Nev. 342, 355 (1872).
283. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
284. Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 359 (1874) (separate schools are not a denial of equal privileges).
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elevated to the Supreme Court, in an 1878 federal circuit court case in
Louisiana, holding that separate schools for blacks did not constitute a
denial of "equal protection." 285 Passing on a New York statute of 1864,
the New York court noted in 1883 that separate schools obtain generally
in the States of the Union, and do not offend equal protection. 286 And
citing Roberts v. Boston, the court stated: "The attempt to enforce social
intimacy and intercourse between the races, by legal enactment, would
probably tend only to embitter the prejudices . . . which exists between
them .... "'287
"Separate but equal" has become an opprobrious epithet in our time,
but the key to the meaning the fourteenth amendment held for the framers
is furnished by the contemporaneous constructions, which confirm the
legislative history. "The criterion of constitutionality," said Justice
Holmes, "is not whethei we believe the law to be for the public
good. "288

285.
286.
287.
288.

Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, 3 F. Cas. 294 (C. Ct. D. La. 1878) (No. 1,361).
People exrel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438,449 (1883).
Id. at 448.
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 570 (1923) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
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